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CUTTING THE NIMBIAN KNOT: A PRIMER
Denis Binder*
INTRODUCTION
The Not-in-My-Backyard ("NIMBY") phenomenon is well understood to-
day. Local groups organize to oppose, and often defeat, a proposal of poten-
tially disruptive community impact. Such proposals are sometimes referred to
as Locally Unwanted/Unloved Land Uses ("LULUs"). The NIMBY problem
has been escalating in recent years.' Opposition exists to piojects as varied as
nuclear power plants,2 dams,3 prisons," roads," halfway houses and group
homes, 6 day-care centers,7 sanitary landfills, 8 incinerators, 9 oil refineries,' 0 low-
* Professor of Law, Western New College; S.J.D, 1973, L.L.M., 1971, University of Michigan;
J.D., 1970, A.B., 1967, University of San Francisco.
I. See Delogu, "'NIMBY" as a National Environmental Problem, 35 S.D.L. REV. 198 (1990).
2. Disputes over nuclear power are longstanding. However, the relatively small "research" reac-
tors on the campuses of many universities have received little attention. Columbia University con-
structed a 250-kilowatt reactor on 120th Street and Amsterdam that on its Morningside Heights
Campus in Manhattan. New York City enacted an ordinance which required municipal licensing
of a nuclear reactor. The ordinance was held preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. See United
States v. City of New York, 463 F. Supp. 604, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). After the Three Mile Island
accident, Columbia University canceled plans to activate the reactor. N.Y. Times, May 20, 1979,
at 23, col. 1.
3. See, e.g., Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that an environmental impact statement that addressed a dam construction project was ade-
quate, and, therefore, injunctive relief was denied); Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276
(9th Cir. 1974) (same); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 677 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Or.
1987) (holding that the Army Corps of Engineers was allowed to continue partial construction of
a dam).
4. See, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding that the State of Virginia
could not divert federal aid that was slated for construction of a penal reception and medical
center, when construction of the center met public opposition); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823
(2d Cir. 1972) (holding that in determining whether a federal action to construct a jail will "sig-
nificantly" affect the human environment, the proposed project shall be considered according to
the adverse environmental effects it will cause, over and above the effects created by existing uses
in the area and the qualitative harmful environmental effects of the action itself), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908.
5. See, e.g., Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming the lower court's
lifting of an injunction that prevented construction of a highway); Druid Hills Civil Ass'n v. Fed-
eral Highway Admin., 833 F.2d 1545 (11 th Cir. 1987) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 819 (1988);
Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio 1984)
(same).
6. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In a test case,
the Justice Department filed suit against the City of Cleburne, claiming that the city had denied a
special-use permit to construct a group home for the mentally retarded because of opposition by
neighbors. Id. at 437. The Supreme Court struck down the city zoning ordinance that required the
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income public" and senior citizen housing, 2 commuter train stations,' mili-
tary bases, installations, and projects," and weather stations.' 5 Society recog-
nizes the need for many of these facilities, but few communities are receptive
to them.' 6 In the past, society had generally followed an implicit policy of
ignoring uncertain environmental risks until disaster struck.'7 Now, potentially
impacted communities attempt to stop the LULUs before any actual risk
materializes.
The public collectively desires the benefits of an affluent society but does not
wish to bear individually the risks and costs that accompany material prosper-
ity. 8 As long as the electricity goes on with the click of a switch, or the water
permit on equal protection grounds. Id. at 435; see also Lee, Suburb Sued for Unfair Zoning.
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1989, at 40 (describing a similar lawsuit, filed under the amended Fair Housing
Act, against the City of Chicago Heights, Illinois). The case was eventually settled when the city
agreed to issue a previously denied permit to construct the home, as well as pay $45,000 in dam-
ages. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1990, at A16, col. 4.
7. See, e.g., Howard v. City of Garland, 917 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1990) (upholding a zoning
ordinance that prohibited a commercial day-care facility to operate for more than four nonresi-
dential children without a use permit).
8. See infra notes 69-96 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Ensco, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding a Union County,
Arkansas ordinance preempted by the Resource Conservation Recovery Act).
10. Between 1970 and 1990, at least two dozen attempts to build a new East Coast refinery
failed. Crim, The Nimby Syndrome in the 1990s: Where Do You Go After Getting to "No"?, 21
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 132, 133 (May 4, 1990); see also In re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., 310
A.2d 736 (Me. 1973) (affirming the Environmental Improvement Commission's denial of plain-
tiff's application to develop an oil refinery).
1I. See, e.g., Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973) (denying a
community's effort to enjoin the building of a moderate to low-income housing project).
12. See, e.g., United Neighbors Civic Ass'n v. Pierce, 563 F. Supp. 200, 206-07 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (holding that the Department of Housing and Urban Development did not act arbitrarily in
declining to require the filing of an environmental impact statement before a senior citizen hous-
ing project with less than 500 units was constructed); Lower Moreland Homeowner's Ass'n v.
Department of Housing & Urban Dev., 479 F. Supp. 886, 901 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that a
homeowner's association was entitled to a preliminary injunction to prevent the Department of
Housing and Urban Development from financing a senior citizens' housing project).
13. See, e.g., Inman Park Restoration, Inc. v. Urban Mass Transp. Admin., 414 F. Supp. 99
(N.D. Ga. 1975) (holding that an environmental impact statement drawn up with regard to an
urban mass transportation project was sufficient despite protests of city residents), afl'd sub nom.
Save Our Sycamore v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 576 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1978).
14. See, e.g., Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (denying a
community's effort to enjoin construction of a military base).
15. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1990, at B3, col. 5.
16. As Professor Delogu noted, "The range of developments, and activities which individual
towns frequently seek to exclude encompasses both public and private sector undertakings that are
essential and integral parts of our society on both an economic and social sense." Delogu, The
Dilemma of Local Land Use Control: Power Without Responsibility, 33 ME. L. REv. 15, 19
(1981).
17. See Silver, The Common Law of Environmental Risk and Some Recent Applications, 10
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 61, 62 (1986).
18. See generally Glaberson, Coping in the Age of NIMBY, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1988, § 3, at
1, col. 2 (discussing the rise in popularity of "NIMBY" groups).
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flows with the twist of a valve, or the garbage disappears when the truck goes
by, the public is satisfied. They do not understand the long-term, comprehen-
sive planning that goes into providing basic services. A clear consensus once
existed that dams, bridges, highways, and power plants represented progress.19
In the not-too-distant past, communities vied for major development projects
because of the economic, growth-inducing benefits to the area. Increasing the
number of jobs, expanding the property tax base, and fortifying a community's
infrastructure were all viewed as "desirable progress."20 Today, short of an
emergency situation, little public support exists in an impacted area for new
projects. What we have in many places today is a 1991 economy trying to run
on a 1961 infrastructure.
Opposition is often based on the "what if" question. The "what if" question
assumes that if, for whatever reason, the unlikely occurs, the tragedy will be of
catastrophic proportions. Thus, the "what if" question focuses on the magni-
tude of the potential injury with a veritable parade of horribles. The question
does not consider the probability of the occurrence.
One court accepted the "what if" argument in the following terms:
It may be that such a disaster could occur only upon a concatenation of
circumstances of not too great probability, and that the odds are against it.
It is common experience, however, that catastrophes occur at unexpected
times and in unforeseen places . . . .A court of equity will not gamble with
human life, at whatever odds, and for loss of life there is no remedy that in
an equitable sense is adequate .
2
Thus, the "what if" question seeks zero-risk as an acceptable level. No threat
to human life is acceptable. In a sense, America has acquired a desire to be
risk-free; a very low threshold of tolerable risk exists. NIMBYism also reflects
a wider problem of the body politic, that is, a paralysis of fear and thus, a
paralysis of will.
The idea that the environmental problems that confront twentieth century
civilization transcend artificial political boundaries is axiomatic. Whether the
problem is truly of an international dimension, such as acid rain or ozone de-
pletion, or seemingly of a much more mundane nature, such as garbage dispo-
19. In reviewing the famous benzene case, Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607 (1980), Professor Rodgers wrote that the disparate opinions among justices in the
case may reflect simply "the fact that we live in a time when values are in disarray. Institutions
caught in the flux of technological and social change are in for a rough ride until and unless new
grounds for consensus emerge." Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk Assessment: The Role of Deci-
sion Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11 ENVTL. L. 301, 302 (1981).
20. This view was best exemplified when states granted eminent domain powers to railroads and
utilities. Although compensation was paid for the taking of the lands, environmental factors were
irrelevant to the actual exercise of eminent domain. Montana went so far as to give a private
copper company, Anaconda, the power to condemn private lands for copper production, which
resulted in one-fifth of Butte, Montana being devoured by an open pit mine. See MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 70-30-102(15), 70-30-103-4, 82-2-221 (1988).
21. Harris Stanley Coal & Land Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 154 F.2d 450, 453 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 761 (1946).
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sal, the reality is that solutions must often occur on a comprehensive basis-be
it regional, state, national, or global. Nevertheless, the fact that at one level,
such as the state or county, governmental bodies are actively seeking a solu-
tion, does not preclude other bodies of government, such as cities, towns, or
even neighborhoods in the impacted area, from actively opposing the proposal.
Such strong crosscurrents do not readily make for comprehensive planning.
Local opposition can forestall any meaningful solution to an environmental
problem. NIMBYism concentrates on the immediate threat. The long-term
consequences of defeating the project, to the detriment of society as a whole,
are not considered because the community is only concerned with the immedi-
ate local impact. Local defeat of a project often dooms comprehensive plan-
ning, entails adverse regional and national consequences, and frequently in-
creases the risks and costs for everyone, including the hostile community. For
example, local opposition to hazardous waste treatment facilities or new sani-
tary landfills increases illegal dumping of toxic waste and solid waste. In other
words, the alternative to legal disposal is the "Midnight Dumper." Similarly,
local bans or restrictions on the transportation of hazardous substances may
often result in simply diverting the hazardous materials to another jurisdiction,
often at an increased risk to society as a whole.2 2
Community bans can result in total paralysis.2 8 By way of example, Brook-
haven National Laboratories generates nuclear waste on Long Island.", The
only land route off Long Island is through New York City.2 5 The shipment of
waste from Brookhaven suddenly came under the glare of attention after a
twenty-five year perfect safety record .2 The director of the New York City
Health Department's Bureau of Radioactive Control estimated that release of
just one percent of the cargo in densely populated Queens or Manhattan
would cause 100,000 "prompt deaths" and one million fatal cases of cancer.2"
This is truly a "what if" scenario that, at the minimum, unnerves the public.
The New York City Council then banned the shipment of nuclear waste
through New York, forcing the waste carrying trucks to enter the mainland
through New London, Connecticut. 8 When Brookhaven requested permission
from New London to schedule ten nuclear waste shipments through that city,
22. See Note, Preemption of Local Laws by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 53
U. CI. L. REV. 654, 654-55 (1986) (suggesting that the roles of local and federal governments
must be clarified before a harmonious network of regulations for safe waste transportation and
disposal may be produced).
23. See Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the Illinois
Spent Fuels Act, which prohibited the importation of spent nuclear fuel for storage at the only
operating commercial spent fuel storage site in the United States, violated the commerce clause),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
24. N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1978, at B3, col. 1.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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New London's health director denied the permits. 9 One resident of New
London declared, "When you think of nuclear waste, you don't think of any-
thing good. . . .As much as they don't want it there [in New York City], I
don't want it here."80 This statement ignores the larger amount of nuclear
waste generated in eastern Connecticut81 and the nuclear submarine construc-
tion a few miles away in Groton, Connecticut. The standoff was finally re-
solved by the Court of Appeals for the second circuit. 82 The appellate court
upheld regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Trans-
portation, pursuant to the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act. 8 The
regulations allowed such hazardous materials to be transported along high-
ways in densely populated areas, since, in the Department's view, this mode of
transportation afforded an acceptable level of safety. 4 In effect, New York
City's ban was preempted.
Similarly, bans on offshore oil drilling, no matter how rational they might
appear to the local community in the wake of the Exxon Valdez incident and
the legacy of the Santa Barbara oil blowout, impose great costs on the coun-
try. As a result of such bans, we are now importing almost half of our oil,8
which necessitates more transportation. Statistically, transportation by tanker
is much riskier than production of offshore oil.86
29. Hartford Courant, Oct. 15, 1978, at 26, col. 1.
30. N.Y. Times, supra note 24, at B3, col. 2. Incidentally, the original route through 1976
involved shipping the spent fuel from Long Island, over the Queensboro Bridge to 59th Street,
through midtown Manhattan, and exiting Manhattan over the George Washington Bridge. The
new route involves traveling over the Throgs Neck Bridge to 1-95, to the Cross Westchester Ex-
pressway, to the Tappan Zee Bridge, thereby bypassing Manhattan.
31. There are three nuclear reactors generating electricity in Waterford, Connecticut, which is
ten miles from New London.
32. See City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied. 465 U.S. 1055 (1984). In City of New York, the district court held that the Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act required the Department of Transportation ("DOT") to implement
regulations that maximized public safety not only for the nation as a whole, but for every jurisdic-
tion in the country. City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 539 F. Supp. 1237, 1289
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd. 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984). There-
fore, the lower court concluded that the DOT must require shippers to use the safest of the alter-
native forms of transportation. Id. The court declared that it was "impermissible, in the face of
credible risk with substantial potential consequences, for DOT to declare a certain level of safety
'acceptable' regardless of the possibility of achieving higher levels through reasonable measures."
Id. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Congress did not intend the regulation to maximize
public safety, particularly on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. City of New York, 715 F.2d at
740.
33. See 715 F.2d at 741.
34. See id. at 737-38.
35. Boston Globe, Mar. 28, 1991, at 1, col. 4, at 45, col. I (according to the American Petro-
leum Institute, imported oil accounted for 46.9% of total usage during 1990).
36. Organizers of a boycott against Exxon have compiled data from the Coast Guard Pollution
Incident Reporting System showing that from 1980 through 1986, 91 million gallons of oil and 36
million gallons of other toxic substances were spilled into United States waters. Shabecoff, The
Rash of Tanker Spills Is Part of a Pattern of Thousands a Year, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1989, at
A20, col. 1. Two-thirds of the spilled oil came from tankers and barges. Id.
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The methods used by communities to block or close LULUs can be subtle
and sophisticated, or blunt. Such methods may range from outright bans, zon-
ing,"7 size88 and capacity limits, denial of erstwhile routine permits, statewide
legislation or referenda," strict safety inspections,"0 rigorous licensing require-
ments" and a variety of fee structures,'42 shipment-by-shipment or truck-by-
truck permit requirements, studies ad infinitum,4 and requirements of abso-
37. "in San Diego, voters effectively barred incinerators by passing a zoning amendment ban-
ning them within a certain distance of schools." Peterson, Toxic Ash and Costs Worry the Neigh-
bors of Incinerators, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1987, at 1, col. 3, at 46, col. 1.
38. Goshen, New York enacted such an ordinance. The first provision of the ordinance limited
the combined acreage of all existing and closed landfills in the town to a maximum of 300 acres.
See Al Turi Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Goshen, 556 F. Supp. 231, 232 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without
opinion, 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982). The second part of the ordinance provided that no permit
could be issued to a sanitary landfill that contained less than 10 acres or more than 50 acres. See
id. at 235. In 1982, the number of operating and closed facilities totalled 294 acres; thus, a total
of only six more acres was available for use as a landfill. Id. In Al Turi Landfill, because ex-
panding the existing landfill by six acres would be uneconomical, the ordinance operated to pre-
clude the plaintiff from expanding his existing facility. See id. The federal court held that the
ordinance limiting the size of landfills in town did not violate the commerce clause. Id. at 236-38.
39. Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 518 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.
Wash. 1981) (holding that a Washington state referendum that banned all nonmedical radioactive
waste generated out of state was unconstitutional under both the supremacy clause and the com-
merce clause), afd, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied. 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
40. For example, Pennsylvania turned back 28 out-of-state garbage trucks on March 14, 1990,
for safety violations at the New Jersey border. State Turns Back 28 Garbage Trucks in Safety
Drive on Out-of-State Haulers, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1896 (Mar. 23, 1990). In Sep-
tember of 1989, Governor Robert P. Casey issued an executive order that directed state officials to
cite trash haulers for failure to comply with Pennsylvania laws and regulations. Id. The practice
has been labeled "trashnet." Id.
41. Rollins Envtl. Servs. (FS) v. Parish of St. James, 775 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1985). This case
involved a parish ordinance that had the effect of shutting down a new facility established for
draining and shipping PCB fluids. Id. at 631. The court ruled that the ordinance had the illegiti-
mate objective of regulating an area already preempted by federal statute. Id. at 637. The court
further stated that the ordinance violated the commerce clause. Id. at 635.
42. For example, Utah charges $20 per ton for out-of-state hazardous waste, as compared to
only $8 for in-state hazardous waste. Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1991, at A], col. 5.
43. Delay can be achieved by seemingly endless and interminable studies. No decision can be
reached until final studies are prepared and all issues resolved. The existing studies, however, will
always raise issues requiring additional studies. See. e.g., British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 564
F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977). In British Airways, the Port Authority unsuccessfully attempted to bar
Concorde SST flights into Kennedy Airport by conducting endlegs, duplicative studies of noise and
vibration problems. Id. at 1004-05. The court stated:
If ever there was a case in which a major technological advance was in imminent
danger of being studied into obsolescence, this is it. There comes a time when relegat-
ing the solution of an issue to the indefinite future can so sap petitioners of hope and
resources that a failure to resolve the issue within a reasonable period is tantamount
to refusing to address it at all. The same is true of studying the question in such a
manner that the issue will disappear by sheer frustration.
Id. at 1010.
Defeat of the unwanted can thus be achieved by studying a proposal to death. At the end of
1987, Waste Management abandoned its six-year battle to obtain the necessary permits from the
federal government to incinerate toxic wastes at sea. Shabecoff, Company Abandons Proposal on
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lute safety."" Pursuant to the question left open by City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey,"" proposals have been made for states to take over ownership of
facilities, thus enabling them to exclude out-of-state wastes. In one case, a
county tried to condemn land to avoid a dump."6 While public opposition usu-
ally confines itself to acceptable means, violent measures are sometimes
taken,' 7 such as torching of proposed halfway houses48 and threats to a candi-
date's life.' 9
Burning Toxic Waste At Sea, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1988, at 1, col. 1; see also Waste Management
v. EPA, 669 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that the EPA's decision to defer issuing operat-
ing permits for ocean incineration until specific regulations were promulgated was not arbitrary,
capricious, 'or an abuse of discretion). The EPA later closed down its ocean incineration rulemak-
ing program and stopped work on proposed regulations. New York Firm Says EPA Should Con-
sider Ocean Incineration of Municipal Solid Waste, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2393 (Apr.
1, 1988).
Subsequently, the only other surviving proposal for ocean incineration was dropped, again after
a failure of the EPA to issue the necessary regulations. See Seaburn, Inc. v. EPA, 712 F. Supp.
218 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that EPA's interpretation of Ocean Dumping Ban Act, which
equated ocean incineration with ocean dumping, was reasonable).
44. An editorial in the Los Angeles Times on the proposed Auburn Dam stated, "Let's build it
if it's safe." See Okrent, Comment on Societal Risk, 208 SCIENCE 372, 374 (Apr. 25, 1980). The
Auburn Dam, located roughly 30 miles northeast of Sacramento, California on the north bank of
the American River, was to be 685 feet high and designed to withstand a sizable earthquake of a
5.5 magnitude on the Richter Scale with a foundation displacement of one inch. Hill, California
Rejects U.S. Dam Plan as Insufficiently Earthquake Proof, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1979, at A16,
col. 4. A state advisory panel recommended that the dam be designed to withstand a 6.5 magni-
tude earthquake, with five inches of foundation displacement. California then effectively vetoed
the dam after $200 million had been spent on it. Id. As of 1989, four full-time workers were still
employed on the project, which by then had $300 million invested in it. Hoge, Stalled Since '75,
Auburn Dam Still Has Its Believers, San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, July 30,
1989, at B3, col. 1.
Only the Delaney Amendment for food additives incorporates a zero-risk standard for carcino-
gens. The amendment prohibits the Department of Health and Human Services from listing any
additive that the Secretary finds to cause cancer in man or animals. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A)
(1988). See generally, Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of
Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress? 5 YALE J. ON REG. I
(1988) (discussing the scope of the Delaney Amendment and the Food and Drug Administration's
enforcement of the amendment).
45. 437 U.S. 617 (1978); see infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
46. See Earth Management, Inc. v. Heard County, 248 Ga. 442, 283 S.E.2d 455 (1981) (hold-
ing that the county exceeded its eminent domain powers in condemning a parcel of land on the
pretext that the land was necessary to build a public park when the county's real purpose in
condemning the land was to prevent the construction of a hazardous waste disposal facility).
47. In New York, members of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Siting Commission have been
run off research sites and burned in effigy in upstate counties where they have identified potential
low-level nuclear waste dumps. Verhovek, Panel Proposes Paying Towns to Take Waste, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 18, 1991, at B3, col. 6.
48. In one instance, three residents of a quiet middle-class block in Queens, New York were
charged with setting fire to an unoccupied house on their block. The city had intended to shelter
six foster-care infants in the house. N.Y. Times, May I, 1987, at Al, col. 5. Similarly, a fire,
suspected to be caused by arson, destroyed a soon-to-be opened group home for mentally ill people
in Nassau County, New York. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1987, at B3, col. 4.
49. Governor Orr of Nebraska announced during her reelection campaign that her life had
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NIMBY opposition is often not limited to proposed projects in one's own
community. The "backyard" can be construed more broadly to include sur-
rounding communities. For example, a consortium of local governments north-
west of Chicago attempted to build a municipal solid waste landfill. Their at-
tempt was challenged by four suburbs near the proposed facility.50 On an even
broader level, NIMBY sometimes translates as "NOPE"-"Nowhere On
Planet Earth."
Community hostility should be viewed as genuine. People are naturally con-
cerned about potential risks to themselves and their families, to the exclusion
of the greater needs of the public at large.5 1 Dramatic disasters, such as Bho-
pal, Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and the Exxon Valdez, become ingrained
in the public consciousness. Memories of these past incidents, which we can
refer to as the "Love Canal Syndrome," are revived when new proposals are
advanced. Phrases such as "known carcinogen," "increased risk of cancer," or
"hazardous substance" are almost guaranteed to arouse instant fear and hos-
tility. Fear of the "what if" question is so pervasive that facts alone, such as a
one-in-a-million increase in the risk of cancer, will not, by themselves, over-
come the fear.
No matter how irrational, fear exists, thereby precluding rational solutions
to many problems. Government and expert assurances of safety are disbe-
lieved. 2 Enactment of federal and state statutes, such as the Comprehensive
been threatened as a result of her refusal to block a proposed radioactive-waste warehouse. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 10, 1990, at A21, col. 3.
50. Municipal Landfill Proposed near Chicago Subject to Legal Challenges by Four Suburbs,
19 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 82 (May 20, 1988).
51. This feeling is echoed in a statement by Senator Warren G. Magnuson of Washington
State, who opposed a proposed oil transshipment facility, "Why should Puget Sound become a
dumping point for somebody else's oil?" Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Sept. 3, 1977, at A3, col. 4.
These protective, exclusionary feelings are sometimes also reflected in local zoning ordinances.
The case of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), involved a zoning ordinance that
restricted the number of persons, unrelated by blood, adoption, or marriage, that could live to-
gether in a residential area, to two. Id. at 2. The zoning ordinance was directly aimed at excluding
"unruly and disruptive" students from the nearby SUNY-Stony Brook campus. Id. at 9. The
court upheld the ordinance as a valid exercise of the zoning power. Id. at 10. Justice Douglas
wrote, in words that closely echo the sentiments of many NIMBY disputes:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are
legitimate guidelines in a land use project addressed to family needs. . . . The police
power . . . is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the bless-
ings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.
Id. at 9.
One year later, Justice Douglas had much less sympathy for these perspectives when the subject
was exclusionary zoning. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518-19 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (dissenting from the majority's denial of standing on the ground that two of the plaintiff
associations represented the communal feelings of the residents).
52. See, e.g., Hartford Courant, Jan. 26, 1991, at 63, col. 3. The article, reporting on local
concern about pesticide spraying of apple orchards, stated, "Although tests done on water wells
near . . . [an] apple orchard show no contamination from pesticides, neighbors who requested the
testing still worry that the pesticides are a health threat. 'We're not happy at all,' said [an adjoin-
ing neighbor]. . . . 'Pesticides are poison.' " Id.
CUTTING THE NIMBIAN KNOT
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA")"
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"),5"4 have not
eased the public's concerns."5 Whether or not the public's fears are grounded
in scientific fact is irrelevant because the public perception effectively becomes
the public reality." The potential becomes the actual to the public. The "what
if" question becomes a certainty. Decisionmakers, particularly the representa-
tives elected in the affected areas, must respond accordingly. In this atmo-
sphere, inadequacies in the underlying database or preliminary figures subject
to revision in later studies do not assuage the public's concerns. It is also pru-
dent to keep in mind the admonitions of a manufacturer's spokesperson:
"Technology can solve most of the problems, but it's hard to demonstrate that
a 15-story incinerator won't be noticed in the neighborhood.
'
"
5 7
Even if defeat of a proposed project constitutes a "victory" for the success-
ful community, another failure for society has occurred. Defeat of a proposed
project can be exceedingly costly to the proponent,5 8 as well as send a message
of deterrence to other developers. Yet, it is reasonable to expect that an im-
pacted community will attempt to minimize the risk to itself so as to protect
the health, safety, and general welfare of the community. In doing so, the
"few" in the impacted community who will bear the risk, conflict with the
multitude, who will partake of the benefits of the project. For example, in
Bradley v. American Smelting & Refining Co.," the plaintiffs complained of
effluents blowing over their land from the defendant's plant.60 The plaintiffs
did not complain of actual damages; instead, the plaintiffs alleged that they
suffered fear and anxiety about health risks associated with the defendant's
emissions.6" The Washington Supreme Court summarized the overall issue in
terms that underlie the thrust of this Article:
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
54. Id. §§ 6901-6987.
55. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988), regulates existing and new on and off-site man-
agement facilities through a permit system. RCRA is intended to ensure that the facilities are
safely designed and operated. Tarlock, Anywhere But Here: An Introduction to State Control of
Hazardous-Waste Facility Location. 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y, 1, 2 (1981). In this respect,
RCRA has failed in that most existing sites have closed down and few new ones have opened up,
thereby limiting the disposal options for hazardous wastes.
56. The conflict is further intensified when state agencies, charged with regulating the LULU,
view the problem as essentially a technical one to be solved by good engineering. At the same
time, the impacted community may focus on the risk, distrusting the safety assurances of the
experts. Tarlock, supra note 55, at 12-13.
57. Richards, Burning Issue: Energy from Garbage Loses Some of Promise as Wave of the
Future, Wall St. J., June 16, 1988, at 1, col. 6, at 13, col. 1.
58. For example, after four years and $14 million in private investment, a proposal for a haz-
ardous waste incinerator by Clean Harbors, Inc. in Braintree, Massachusetts, was defeated. Bos-
ton Globe, Sept. 21, 1990, at 53, col. 3.
59. 104 Wash. 2d 677, 709 P.2d 782 (1985) (answering certified questions from district court),
later proceeding. 635 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
60. Id. at 679, 709 P.2d at 784.
61. Bradley v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 635 F. Supp. 1154, 1158 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
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The issues present the conflict in an industrial society between the need of
all for the production of goods and the desire of the landowner near the
manufacturing plant producing those goods that his use and enjoyment of
his land not be diminished by the unpleasant side effects of the manufactur-
ing process. A reconciliation must be found between the interest of the many
who are unaffected by the possible poisoning and the few who may be
affected. 62
The NIMBY syndrome often overlaps another phenomenon, referred to as
"the law of unintended consequences." We tend to look at many problems in
isolation, such that we "solve" the immediate problem without thinking of the
consequences elsewhere. 63 For example, many communities have banned leaf
burning because of the air pollution consequences. However, the need to dis-
pose of leaves still remains. The second largest source of garbage is yard
waste, therefore, banning leaf burning exacerbates the waste disposal problem
in society.6' In response, many communities now prohibit the dumping of land-
scape waste into landfills. 5 Thus, an ostensible solution to one problem, air
pollution, led to another problem, overcrowded landfills, which is now in
search of its own solution.
Occasionally, some communities are receptive to NIMBY activities. Even
today, there are times when some communities or states actively solicit what
others consider to be a LULU." Ironically, once a community possesses an
otherwise unwanted project, and its tax base soars, other communities wish to
partake of the tax bonanza. 67
In general, though, as long as states and local communities believe that they
can export, exclude, or prevent the "problem," they have little incentive to
resolve it. To the extent that individual communities can isolate themselves
from the burdens of society, the result will be a balkanization of the United
States. The purpose of this Article is to address ways to cut the NIMBian
Knot. In doing so, we will take a look at the solid waste/hazardous waste
disposal problem to illustrate NIMBian paralysis.
62. Bradley, 104 Wash. at 681, 709 P.2d at 785. For a further discussion of Bradley, see infra
notes 298-303 and accompanying text.
63. Thus, energy conservation, in the form of insulation, weatherizing, and winterization, in-
creases risks from radon and other indoor air pollutants trapped in the semisealed building.
64. In 1988, yard waste constituted over 20% by weight and 10% by volume of municipal solid
waste. Paper and paperboard products constituted 34% of the discards by weight and 34% by
volume. U.S. EPA, CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED STATES:
1990 UPDATE ES-4 (Executive Summary 1990).
65. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I II1, para. 1022.22 (Smith-Hurd 1990).
66. For example, a few years ago, three small, remote towns in the Mojave Deseri vied for the
siting of a low-level nuclear waste depository. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1987, at 18, col. 1.
67. The city of Seneca, Illinois has the highest per capita expenditure of any school district in
Illinois. Seneca can afford to spend so much on education because it allowed Commonwealth
Edison Company to build a nuclear power plant there ten years ago. The utility pays about
$10,000,000 per year to the community in taxes. Now other communities in the state are angling
for ways to get their hands on the tax bounty. See Johnson, Nuclear Plant Gives Schools Wind-
fall Others Seek, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1990, at AI, col. 2.
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I. WASTE DISPOSAL: THE PROBLEM
The NIMBY problem is best exemplified by both the solid waste and haz-
ardous waste embroglios. This is due to the magnitude and consequences of
the problem, as well as the extensively litigated and documented propensity of
jurisdictions to go their own way, oblivious to the broader consequences of
their actions. Early on, Professor Rodgers succinctly summarized the problem:
"It is an axiom that solid waste and garbage belong in somebody else's back-
yard."'6 8 NIMBYism has caused existing facilities to close, has barred the
opening of new landfills, and has limited the expansion of existing facilities.
A. Solid Waste
The number of landfills that accept solid waste is declining at a rapid pace.
Many states have run out of capacity at existing facilities and are now export-
ing substantial quantities of garbage to other states and foreign countries.69
Very few new sites are opening up, so the problem intensifies. The problem
was highlighted a few years ago by the voyage of a barge carrying garbage
from Islip, Long Island, searching for a port in the Caribbean to dispose of its
cargo.7 0 This modern version of Jason and the Argonauts was updated nightly
on the evening news.
While the Islip, New York garbage barge received widespread national pub-
licity, a barge containing 28 million pounds of Philadelphia incinerator ash
voyaged much longer. 7 ' This barge wandered the seven seas for more than two
years, unsuccessfully seeking a disposal site.7 2 In September of 1986, the
68. W. RODGERS, HORNBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 667 (1977). After all, not many peo-
ple relish living near a landfill with its odors, pollution, and fleets of trucks. Perhaps Senator Dan
Coats of Indiana has stated it best: "Hoosiers are no more anxious to live next to East Coast trash
than the residents of the East Coast appear to be." Gold, Shipping Trash out of State Stirs
Backlash, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1990, at BI, col. 6.
69. New England exports hundreds of tons of solid waste daily to Quebec. Boston Globe, Dec.
13, 1988, at 24, col. 1. The Marshall Islands have agreed to accept millions of tons of trash
annually from a California waste disposal company for $56 million a year. Boston Globe, Dec. 23,
1989, at 6, col. 5.
70. Islip's problem was caused in part by enactment of a statute that sought to close landfills on
Long Island. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 27-0704 (McKinney 1983). The statute is
designed to protect Long Island's groundwater, which is the source of drinking water on the is-
land, from contamination. Id. Pursuant to the statute, no new landfills in a deep flow recharge
area are allowed, and existing facilities must be closed by the end of 1990. Id.; see Town of Islip v.
Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 50, 473 N.E.2d 756, 484 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1984) (granting partial summary
judgment since the statute did not violate the relevant state constitutional provisions); see also
New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Town of Islip, 71 N.Y.2d 292, 306-07, 520
N.E.2d 517, 524, 525 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1988) (upholding "an order on consent of the Department of
Environmental Conservation allowing the continued use of an Islip landfill subject to various re-
strictions"). For a discussion of the growing national solid waste problem, see Special Analysis,
Barge Carrying Unwanted Garbage from Long Island Becomes Symbol for Larger Problem of
Solid Waste Disposal, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 332 (May 15, 1987).
71. Ship Dumps Philadelphia Ash, But Where?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1988, at A25, col. I.
72. After 2 Years, Ship Dumps Toxic Ash, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1988, at A22, col. I.
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Khian Sea sailed from Philadelphia for a disposal site in the Bahamas.7 8 Eigh-
teen months later, the barge was back in Philadelphia with most of the ash
still aboard.7 ' The barge subsequently slipped out of Philadelphia and later
reported an unloading of the ash. 75 The cargo had been turned away by at
least eleven countries, including the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Hon-
duras, Costa Rica, Guinea-Bissan and Cape Verde.7' During its two-year od-
yssey, the vessel was renamed twice, changing from the Khian Sea to the Feli-
cia and finally the Pelican, and had been variously registered in Liberia,
Honduras, and the Bahamas.
7 7
The current crisis was certainly foreseeable. A 1973 study estimated that
almost half of the country's cities would run out of current disposal capacity in
one to five years.7 8 The study warned that half of the cities could not rely
totally upon land disposal of wastes within their own jurisdictions.79 Instead,
according to the study, these cities would have to consider other methods of
disposal that did not require great areas of land.80 One of the observations of
the report was that solid waste management necessarily transcends local
jurisdictions. 81
Currently, the largest exporters of solid waste are New Jersey and New
York. New Jersey, which complained of garbage imports in City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey,82 now exports over half of its garbage.83 Many New
Jersey communities find it cheaper to ship garbage 400 miles to Ohio than to
dispose of it at New Jersey sites.8 ' Ohio imported 2.4 million tons of garbage
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Ship Dumps Philadelphia Ash, But Where?, supra note 71, at A25, col. 1.
77. After 2 Years. Ship Dumps Toxic Ash, supra note 72, at A22, col. 1.
78. See NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES & U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, SOLID WASTE MAN-
AGEMENT TASK FORCE, CITIES AND THE NATION'S DISPOSAL CRISIS 18 (1973).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2.
81. Id. at 7. Thus, the study recommended removing transportation barriers and resolving
boundary restrictions against proper disposal across jurisdiction lines. Id. at 15. The report called
for greater resource recovery and recycling, federal aid, statutes, and regulations.
82. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
83. Gold, Shipping Trash out of State Stirs Backlash, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1990, at BI, col. 6
(stating that private carters in New Jersey export 55% of the state's trash); Schmidt, The Mid-
west Tries to Slow the Flow of Eastern Trash, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1989, § 4, at 4, col. I (stating
that many New Jersey towns and counties say that it is less expensive to truck garbage to Ohio).
In addition, New York exports I1% of its garbage. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1990, at BI, col. 2.
Between them, the two states account for over one-half of the interstate movement of trash. N.Y.
Times, July 18, 1990, at BI, col. 6. New York exports 2.4 million tons of trash annually, and New
Jersey exports 5.5 million tons. Most Interstate Trash Movement Beneficial; New York, New
Jersey Big Exporters, NSWMA Says, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 537 (July 27, 1990).
Neither state imports trash. Id.
84. Schmidt, supra note 83, at 4, col. I. To some extent, New Jersey is responsible for its
problems in solid waste disposal. There were 331 landfills operating statewide in New Jersey in
1972. Passell, The Garbage Problem: It May Be Politics, Not Nature, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1991,
at Cl, col. I, at C6, col. I. By 1988, the number was down to 13, with only two prospective
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in 1987, 1.5 million of which came from New Jersey. s" Likewise, communities
in New York are staggering under the economic costs of waste disposal. 86
Similarly, waste disposal problems are so pressing in parts of the Northeast
and Midwest that the cost of local disposal can reach $150 per ton.8"
Yet, rather than cooperating in local and regional efforts to resolve the is-
sues, communities are attempting to stop garbage from entering their borders.
Myopia precludes comprehensive solutions to the waste disposal problem. A
few states act as though they believe that they can have it both ways, that is,
ship whatever they want out of state at their discretion but bar shipments into
the state. Of special note is Pennsylvania, which is trying to have the best of
both possible worlds. Pennsylvania is the third largest exporter of municipal
solid waste. The state also ships much of its hazardous and medical waste out
of state.88 Yet in 1989, Governor Casey of Pennsylvania issued an executive
order that imposed a two-year moratorium on permits for new or expanded
landfills.8 9 The order provided an exception if the permit applicant could
demonstrate a need for additional capacity, and could further show that at
least seventy percent of the capacity would be utilized by sources located
within Pennsylvania."0 This second limitation essentially froze, at existing
levels, the amount of out-of-state garbage Pennsylvania landfills could accept.
In announcing the freeze, Governor Casey stated, "The ground is shifting
under our feet [because of] the bulk of out-of-state trash. Today, we're taking
a new and decisive step toward controlling our destiny."9
Similarly, New York, which exports eleven percent of its solid waste and a
significant percentage of its hazardous waste, has attempted to limit imports of
hazardous wastes to states that have reciprocal agreements with New York."
landfills seeking the requisite permits. Id.
85. Schmidt, supra note 83, at 4, col. 1.
86. Tax increases on Long Island are partially caused by the spiraling cost of collecting and
disposing of garbage. Lyall, As L.I. s Garbage Mounts, Its Taxes Do Still, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11,
1990, at BI, col. 2. For example, about 40% of Oyster Bay's $169,900,000 budget goes for gar-
bage. Id. It pays $111 per ton to haul the garbage off the island. Id. An average homeowner with
a $230,000 house will pay $424 in garbage taxes in 1991, or roughly half of the total tax bill of
$829. Id.
87. Feder, Railroads Meet Steep Grades in Trying to Haul Trash, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1990,
§ 3, at 12, col. 1.
88. Philadelphia Freezes Landfill Permits in Attempt to Limit Out-of-State Garbage, 20 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1122 (Oct. 27, 1989). Fifty-five percent of Pennsylvania's solid waste is
exported. Id. at 1123.
89. Exec. Order No. 1989-8, 19 Pa. Bull. 4598 (Oct. 17, 1989), reprinted in 4 PA. CODE §§
7.471-.476 (1990).
90. 4 PA. CODE § 7.471(a). Pennsylvania studies indicated that 30% of the municipal waste
disposed of in Pennsylvania was generated outside the state. Johnson, Beyond City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 95 DICK. L. REv. 131, 151 (1990).
91. Paul, Waste Spurs Uncivil War Between State, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1989, at BI3C, col. 3.
92. New York to Limit Hazardous Waste Imports to States That Have Reciprocal Agree-
ments, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1179 (Oct. 19, 1990). Thus, New York, which shipped
26,045 tons of hazardous waste to Ohio in 1988, tried to bar shipments from Ohio to a hazardous
waste landfill in Model City, New York. Boston Globe, Nov. 20, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
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The solid waste problem is not environmental; it is political.93 The land is
there, but the will is missing. Each local group, expressing its displeasure,
frustrates solution. For example, the entrance to the Lopez Canyon Landfill
was blockaded three times by angry citizens in an attempt to close the last
remaining city-owned disposal site in Los Angeles. A proposed incinerator was
scrapped and Los Angeles County refuses to accept any additional trash from
the cities."'
Alternatives are rapidly shrinking."' Ocean incineration, although common
in Europe, died as an alternative in the United States because the EPA
dithered in issuing the appropriate administrative regulations." On-land incin-
eration, whether of a straight incineration nature or of a more "sophisticated"
waste-to-energy process, is under major environmental scrutiny, primarily be-
cause of the high concentration of toxic materials in the ash. These materials
include cadmium, mercury, and silver.
B. Hazardous Waste
The need to minimize, if not eliminate, hazardous waste generation at the
source is widely recognized. Such a goal should be assiduously pursued. How-
ever, even zero generation of new hazardous waste will not eliminate the need
for disposal sites for the hazardous wastes that are found in CERCLA/
Superfund sites or which were otherwise illegally or improvidently disposed of
in the past.17 Quite often a CERCLA cleanup consists of transporting the
New York itself withdrew from a group of Northeastern states working on a regional plan for
disposing of toxic wastes because of perceptions that the state was being asked to take too much
waste. The New York Environmental Conservation Commissioner was unwilling to allow New
York to become the dumping ground of the Northeast for hazardous waste bound for landfills.
N.Y. Times, Oct. I1, 1989, at BI, col. 1.
93. As Congress noted:
Pressures from local citizens place the political system in an extremely vulnerable
position. . . . The broader social need for safe hazardous waste management facilities
often has not been strongly represented in the . . . process [of creating new facilities].
A common result has been . . . no significant increase in hazardous waste capacity
over the past several years.
National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d
713, 716 (1 Ith Cir. 1990) (citing S. REP. No. II, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985)), modified,
reh'g denied, 942 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1991).
94. Beck, Buried Alive, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 27, 1989, at 67.
95. Id.
96. See Seaburn Inc. v. EPA, 712 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1989) (explaining that due to the
overwhelming response in the notice and comment period the regulations had not been promul-
gated until 1977); Waste Management v. EPA, 669 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C. 1.987) (stating that
even in 1987 the regulations had not been promulgated despite the fact that they had been prom-
ised in 1984). See generally, Shabecoff, Burning Toxic Chemicals at Sea Makes Waves on Shore,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1983, § 4, at 10, col. I (discussing the uproar that resulted when the EPA
gave tentative permission for incinerator ships to burn hazardous wastes 150 miles offshore).
97. See Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276 (E.D.N.C. 1981). During the
summer of 1978, 211 miles of rural roads in North Carolina were illegally sprayed with PCB
contaminated liquid wastes. Id. After extensive studies, North Carolina decided to bury the con-
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wastes from the existing CERCLA site to an approved disposal facility. At
present, every state exports hazardous waste to out-of-state treatment and dis-
posal facilities, with thirty-five states being net exporters of hazardous waste.98
Only Alaska and Montana do not currently import hazardous waste for treat-
ment or disposal. 99 Fifteen states are net importers of waste.100 There has thus
developed an extensive interstate commerce and trade in hazardous waste. 01
Many states created their own disposal problems, both in terms of originat-
ing the waste and in respect to ultimate disposal. Three examples of heavily
industrialized states will illustrate this pattern.
In 1985, California had up to twenty facilities permitted to dispose of haz-
ardous waste in properly constructed landfills and evaporation pools. 102 Three
facilities remained by 1990, of which only one could take a full spectrum of
hazardous waste.'0 3 In 1982, there were sixteen treatment and disposal facili-
ties operating in Pennsylvania.1'0  Only seven remained open in 1989. °50 Fi-
nally, we come to Massachusetts, which enacted a statute a decade ago that
allowed the siting of hazardous waste facilities. 06 Not one has been built, and
at least five unsuccessful attempts have been made to locate a new facility. 0 7
In the last instance, $500,000 was spent on legal fees and consulting costs by
the impacted communities in fighting the proposal. 08 Massachusetts continues
to ship seventy percent of the 200,000 tons of hazardous waste generated there
annually out-of-state. 0 9
The destinations for much of the nation's hazardous wastes are Alabama,
Louisiana, and South Carolina. Louisiana imports over 600,000 tons of waste
annually, making it the largest net importer in the United States." Alabama
taminated soil at an approved landfill. Id. The impacted county objected, but its legal objections
failed. Id.
98. See Every State Ships Waste Beyond Borders; 48 Receive Some for Management, Study
Finds, 21 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1800 (Feb. 8, 1991).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Moxley, Lack of New Waste Sites Threaten State's Economic Well-Being, Bus. J., Sept.
10, 1990, at 7, col. I.
103. Id.
104. Comment, Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities in Pennsylvania, 25 DUQ. L.
REV. 299 (1987) (reasoning that strong public opposition is one factor that contributes to the
shortage of disposal facilities).
105. Id.
106. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21D, §§ 1-19 (West 1981).
107. Franklin, Braintree Incinerator Plan Killed, Boston Globe, Sept. 20, 1990, at I, col. 1, at
8, col. 5.
108. Id. at 8, col. 4.
109. Id.
110. In 1987, Louisiana was the country's largest importer of hazardous waste, receiving over
658,000,000 pounds. Almost 79% of the waste came from Arkansas, California, New Jersey, and
Oklahoma. Louisiana Leads in Waste Imports, Study Says, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 867
(Sept. 22, 1989). Louisiana in turn exported only 318 pounds of hazardous waste in 1987. Id.
Each year, three Massachusetts state agencies, several cities, and over 200 Massachusetts firms
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possesses the largest hazardous waste disposal site in the United States at
Emelle, Alabama.
Receiver states have responded through outright bans, limited bans, freezes,
fees, and taxes. For example, in 1988, Oregon adopted rules that prohibit
wastes considered hazardous in the state of origin from being disposed of as
solid waste in Oregon."' At the time of writing this Article, however, propos-
als for resolving the hazardous waste disposal problems have reached an im-
passe around the nation, primarily because of the NIMBY phenomenon."'
II. SOLUTIONS
Proponents of a new project should assume substantial opposition will arise.
Community opposition is a "given" that must be factored into the planning
decision. Failure to anticipate such opposition will often doom the project in
advance." 3 It is essential, therefore, to develop a plan that will surmount the
have shipped thousands of tons of hazardous waste to an incinerator in Louisiana. Tye, Massachu-
setts' Waste Problem Becomes Louisiana's, Boston Globe, Sept. 25, 1989, at 15, col. 1. One Loui-
siana official stated, "We feel like we've become the dumping ground for the whole country." Id.
I ll. See State Restricts Disposal as Solid Waste of Material Considered Hazardous in Cali-
fornia, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1436 (Nov. II, 1988) (noting that the Oregon rule was in
part prompted by plans to build an infectious waste incinerator only three miles from the Califor-
nia-Oregon border).
112. Several developments over the past year indicate more fully the difficulty of resolving sit-
ing disputes. A representative sample of state developments includes:
A) Nevada's governor imposed an 18-month moratorium on solid waste imports into the state
unless covered by an existing agreement. Governor Imposes 18-Month Moratorium on Importa-
tion of Additional Solid Waste, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1815 (Feb. 8, 1991).
B) Oklahoma enacted legislation that will restrict disposal of residential, commercial, and
biomedical waste at sites in the state. Absent a modified permit from the State Department of
Health, sites are banned from accepting more than 200 tons per day of solid waste if that waste is
generated more than 50 miles from the disposal site. Governor Signs Bill Restricting Import of
Residential Commercial Waste, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 321 (June 8, 1990).
C) South Carolina enacted a statute that limited the amount of waste that can be sent to a
commercial landfill in Sumter County from 135,000 tons in 1990 to 110,000 tons by July I, 1991.
Governor Signs Hazardous Waste Import Bill Owners of Commercial Landfill Plan Lawsuit, 21
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 367-77 (June 22, 1990).
D) A South Dakota initiative provides that no large-scale solid waste facility can be sited,
constructed, or operated in South Dakota unless the legislature approves the facility's request for
a solid waste or permit facility. Disposal Company President Says Initiative Will Effectively Shut
Down Lonetree Balefill, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1401 (Nov. 23, 1990).
E) Texas environmental agencies agreed to Governor Richards' call for a two-year moratorium
on permits for new commercial hazardous waste incinerators, cement kilns, and salt dome injec-
tion wells. The agencies also agreed to suspend the processing of all new or pending permit appli-
cations for treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous and nonhazardous industrial waste by
commercial facilities. Governor Richards stated, "We are getting serious about hazardous waste
.... No more will hazardous waste facilities be rammed through the permit process, over the
objections of local communities. No more will they be located near schools or residential areas or
water supplies." State Agencies Agree to Governor's Call for Two-year Hold On Incinerator Per-
mits, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1850 (Feb. 15, 1991).
113. See, e.g., Verhovek, Panel Proposes Paying Towns to Take Waste, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18,
1991, at B3, col. 6. For example, New York had originally planned to choose the best site for a
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expected NIMBY challenge. Realistically, however, no universal solution ex-
ists. Nonetheless, any comprehensive plan, whether at a regional, state, na-
tional, or international level, which imposes greater risks or costs upon one
segment of the community, must address the NIMBY phenomenon if it is to
have a chance to succeed. Proponents need to be aggressive in attacking the
regulatory and other legal obstacles that will be raised against the project.
However, other means should be utilized to avoid regulatory gridlock. A vari-
ety of approaches, both legal and nonlegal, should be employed in addressing
the expected NIMBY challenge.
A. Nonlegal Solutions
Nonlegal solutions to NIMBYism may be political or educational, and may
include citizen involvement and effective use of the media. A general goal is to
resolve issues on the basis of scientific evaluation and reason, facts, and logic,
rather than emotion, passion, prejudice, and media hysteria. However, hard
facts will not, by themselves, overcome hot emotions. Since the NIMBY prob-
lem transcends the technical and environmental, and often is of an emotional
or political nature, the solution must also address the emotional or political
issues. As a starting point, the proposal should, to the greatest extent possible,
avoid residential neighborhoods and areas of critical environmental concern.
1. Citizen Involvement and Education
Components of a successful siting process should include: preliminary an-
nouncement of studies of the need for the facility, laying out the groundwork,
enlisting public and civic leaders in the search for the solution, public educa-
tion, economic incentives, and involvement of local residents from the start in
the planning process. A critical constraint throughout the process is that the
developer must maintain an atmosphere of trust and credibility." 4
The educational component should involve meaningful public involvement
from the very beginning of the site selection process. One of the biggest mis-
takes a proponent of a project can make is to announce at a press conference:
We are pleased to announce that [West Podunk] has been selected as the
site of our new, multimillion dollar, high-technology, solvents recovery
center. There will be 350 new jobs created, and a $25 million increase in the
property tax base of West Podunk. We have been assured by the experts
that no risk exists to the public.
low-level nuclear waste dump site from a technical standpoint, after conducting the search on
purely scientific grounds, even if the surrounding communities were hostile. Id. The Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Siting Commission subsequently concluded that "imposing such a site on an
unwilling community has little or no possibility of success." Id. The Commission concluded that
incentives were needed to get such sites built. Id.
114. Senior executives should personally visit the people living nearest the proposed facility.
Paul, Browning-Ferris Wants New York Towns to Vie for, Not Fight, Proposed Landfill, Wall St.
J., July 20, 1990, at 4B, col. 2.
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This announcement is almost guaranteed to arouse the enmity of residents of
West Podunk and surrounding communities, while failing to gain substantial
support elsewhere. It is foolhardy to believe that a project's benefits, no matter
how great, are going to sell the project on the merits in today's world of
heightened environmental awareness. Even if there is an initial burst of enthu-
siasm and public support for the facility, waves of doubt will surface as the
community becomes aware of the potential risks involved. A recalcitrant com-
munity will not be swayed by an argument that the benefits to society as a
whole will outweigh the risks to the community, because the risks are being
borne solely by the impacted community. They perceive and receive the risks
but do not benefit in kind.
It is also important to recognize that the issue for these communities is not
merely one of safety. The problem is also one of "stigma," such that property
values may drop and potential customers may stay away if the LULU pro-
ceeds. As one businessperson has stated, "Nobody will want to buy a $120,000
condominium if there are drums of toxic waste piled up down the block."115
These concerns must be addressed by the project's proponents early on in
the process. Thus, a statistical, informational, and safety blitz attesting to the
reliability and security of the proposal will not forestall resistance. Prospective
opponents may take a little longer to assimilate such information, but organize
they will. Project proponents would be wise to keep in mind the perspective of
a resident near the Three Mile Island nuclear plant on the prospective restart
of the undamaged unit, "I don't care if it's a little bit of harm or ten times
that amount-I don't want any . . . all those charts are so much gobbledy-
gook to me .... "I's
Instead, a strong, meaningful, public participation process should be in-
cluded from the beginning of the decisionmaking process. Public workshops
should be extensively utilized. 1 7 Meaningful citizen involvement is an ideal
way to identify and respond effectively to local concerns early in the siting
process.118 The concerns raised by citizens are serious and well intended, and
should be addressed as such. Consequently, citizen advisory committees should
be formed, involved in the process, and project proponents should listen to
them. In addition, some of the public's fears and uncertainties can be allayed
by having local community groups review emergency plans, drills, and worker
training programs.
One of the components of a successful strategy is to respond to the "what
if" question, by pointing out the consequences of "what if we don't do it?"
Most specifically, the risks to the health and welfare of the impacted commu-
nity if the project does not proceed should be emphasized. It is also important
I 15. Alsop, Widespread Fear of Hazardous Waste Sites Thwarts State and Industry Disposal
Plans, Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1983, at 33, col. 4.
116. Springfield Morning Union, Mar. 29, 1983 at 3, col. 3.
117. See Davis, Approaches to the Regulation of Hazardous Waste, 18 ENVTL. L. 505, 518
(1988) (suggesting a series of two workshops, the first informational and the second adversarial).
118. See Crim, supra note 10, at 132, 134, 135.
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throughout the process to point to successful facilities elsewhere. While such
successes will not, by themselves, sell a new project, the lessons learned else-
where will help to insure the safety of the project and thereby alleviate some
concerns. An additional strategy to minimize the risk to the impacted commu-
nity and the threat to property values, in some situations, is for the proponent
to offer to buy up a buffer zone around the project, 19 and otherwise guarantee
property values.12
Zero-risk is an unachievable goal; there can be no guarantees of absolute
safety in an imperfect world."' However, if a project proponent meaningfully
involves the public, explores alternatives, responds to questions raised, details
safety measures at the plant and from elsewhere around the world, and even
modifies designs to reduce community impacts and the risks posed to the com-
munity, the level of risk may often times be reduced to an "acceptable" level
for the community.
Of course, there is a more Machiavelian approach to garner community
support and overcome the NIMBY phenomenon. For example, a project pro-
ponent could announce that it is searching for the appropriate location for a
new solvents recovery center somewhere in the state of Ecotopia. After the
announcement, the proponent of the project would conduct a search for the
best location according to detailed criteria. Through a process of elimination
the list of potential sites would reduce itself to a group of semifinalists, then
finalists, and ultimately, the selected site. In this way, when the final selection
is made, the other communities, relieved at not housing the facility, would
politically support the selection.
119. For example, several petro-chemical companies in Louisiana are buying up tracts of land
around their plants as a buffer zone. Schneider, Chemical Plants Buy up Neighbors for Safety
Zone, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
120. Champion International guaranteed property values of anyone living within two miles of a
planned landfill in Riley Township, Ohio. Financial Guarantees Fight NIMBY Syndrome, Wall
St. J., Feb. 7, 1991, at BI, col. 1.
121. See, e.g., Kellman, Anxiety over the TM! Accident: An Essay on NEPA's Limits of In-
quiry, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 219, 247 (1983). "In March 1979, an event with a statistically
insignificant probability of occurring did occur. History is full of instances where the improbable
occurred. Arguably, law should be as responsive to the lessons of history as to the calculations of
technical experts." Id.
In a dissenting opinion in a case involving the transportation of nuclear waste materials, Judge
Oakes pointed out:
"Worst-case" accidents have a way of occurring-from Texas City to the Hyatt Re-
gency at Kansas City, from the Tacoma Bridge to the Greenwich, Connecticut 1-95
bridge, from the Beverly Hills in Southgate, Kentucky to the Cocoanut Grove in Bos-
ton, Massachusetts, and from the Titanic to the DC-10 at Chicago to the 1-95 toll
booth crash and fire-and that alone would end the case for many.
City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 753 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984). See generally Binder, NEPA, NIMBYs and New
Technology, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 11 (1990) (discussing NEPA and addressing the risks
inherent in new technologies).
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2. The Media
One of the major issues that needs to be addressed in resolving the NIMBY
problem is the role of the media. The media responds, of course, to the dra-
matic. If someone says that Chicken Little is falling, then that is worth atten-
tion. If, however, the report is that Chicken Little is still healthy after 415
days, then that statement is not worth coverage. In other words, apocalyptic
views get prompt media attention."' If the statement is repeated often enough,
then the public comes to believe it fervently. Denials and refutations do not
receive the same attention.
A media scare is the modern version of the Depression-era run on the bank.
Once the news is out, everyone scrambles to protect whatever they have. Con-
sequently, what were once purely local or regional disputes may become a
national panic in the glare of media attention. When repeated often enough,
the fears acquire a truth and validity of their own in the public eye. Official
reaction then ensues. For example, an EPA-commissioned study reported chro-
mosome abnormalities in residents of Love Canal.2  The report was formally
communicated to the EPA on May 15, 1980.124 It was on the front page of the
New York Times on May 17, and on May 21 President Carter announced a
decision to evacuate 700 families from their homes near Love Canal.1 25 Love
Canal has, of course, acquired a notoriety of its own.
Subsequently, technical review and follow-ups of the study found major
methodological flaws with the original study.'2 6 In addition, no excess chromo-
some abnormalities of any sort were found.2 7
122. For example, a scientific paper noted how faulty population-health studies are misleading
both the public and physicians about the risks of daily living. Feinstein, Scientific Standards in
Epidemiological Studies of the Menace of Daily Life, 242 SCIENCE 1257 (Dec. 2, 1988). Three
studies, when released, erroneously alarmed the public by claiming some aspect of daily life posed
a health risk; to wit, the tranquilizer reserpine was linked to breast cancer, coffee drinking to
cancer of the pancreas, and alcohol use to breast cancer. Id. at 1261.
The episodes have now developed a familiar pattern. A report appears in a promi-
nent medical journal; the conclusions receive wide publicity by newspapers, television,
and other media; and another common entity of daily life becomes "indicted" as a
'menace" to health-possibly causing strokes, heart attacks, birth defects, cancer.
Id. at 1257.
123. Kolata, Love Canal.: False Alarm Caused By Botched Study. 208 SCIENCE 1239, 1239
(June 13, 1990).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Havender, Once Again, Conclusive Evidence the Sky Is Falling, Wall St. J., Nov. 3,
1983, at 30, col. 3. Another study found no elevated risks of cancer for residents near Love Canal.
Janerich, Burnett, Feck, Hoff, Nasca, Polednak, Greenwald & Vianna, Cancer Incidence in the
Love Canal Area, 212 SCIENCE 1404 (June 19, 1981).
A study sponsored by the Centers for Disease Control, Brookhaven National Laboratory, and
Oak Ridge National Laboratory found that people who lived close to the chemical dump at Love
Canal have not shown an increased incidence of chromosome damage when compared to other
persons living in the Niagara Falls, New York area. The study said that even if chromosome
damage had been found, it would be impossible to know whether such damage might foretell later
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Recently, the media, including a presentation on CBS's popular 60 Minutes,
featured problems with standard amalgam dental fillings, which contain mer-
cury.128 Mercury can escape from the fillings, and has been blamed for various
problems including headaches and multiple sclerosis. Patients flooded back to
their dentists to have their amalgam fillings replaced. Yet, there have been
numerous studies which fail to make any solid connection between human ill-
ness and mercury fillings.129
occurrence of chemical illness. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CYTOGENETIC PATTERNS IN PERSONS LIVING NEAR LOVE CANAL-NEW YORK, 32
MORBIDITY & MORALITY WEEKLY REPORT No. 20, at 261, 262 (May 27, 1983).
At about the same time, however, the Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA") issued a re-
port that questioned an opinion that the Department of Health and Human Services had issued in
early 1982. The earlier opinion concluded that an area near Love Canal would be habitable if
safeguards against canal leakage were imposed. The OTA study concluded that "[w]ith available
information it is not possible to conclude either that unsafe levels of toxic contamination exist or
that they do not exist." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, HABITABILITY OF
THE LOVE CANAL AREA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE DECISION ON THE
HABITABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY DECLARATION AREA 3 (June 1983). The OTA assessment was
based on several factors, including the uneven sampling of soils, an inadequate number of soil
samples, inadequate controls, and wide variability in performance by the contract laboratories.
A subsequent study of field mice (meadow voles) in and around the Love Canal area found that
voles living near Love Canal had a reduced life expectancy, as compared with a control group
living a mile away. Generally, the study showed that the closer the voles were to Love Canal, the
younger they were dying. The'scientists who conducted the study observed signs of liver damage
due to the absorption of a wide variety of toxic compounds. See Christian, Love Canal's Un-
healthy Voles, 16 NAT. HIST. 12-14 (Oct. 1983).
Another study by the Childrens Hospital of Oakland, California found that children living near
Love Canal experienced low birth weights, below normal growth levels, and a variety of health
problems. Studies Show Conflicting Health Views of Residents Exposed to Love Canal Site, 14
Env't Rep. (BNA) 128 (May 27, 1983); Polan & Vianna, Incidence of Low Birth Weight Love
Canal Residents, 226 SCIENCE 1217 (Dec. 7, 1984).
When the Center for Disease Control study was released, the woman who had led the fight to
evacuate 1000 families in 1980 said the new study "was released deliberately to confuse and cause
a smoke screen around the canal in efforts to revitalize the area." N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983, § 4,
at 8, col. 6. Obviously, not everyone was pleased, relieved or gratified by the study. Such a reac-
tion may or may not be reasonable in light of the vast unknowns, coupled with a widespread
distrust of government.
These studies are but a recent sample of many of the studies of Love Canal, which may well be
the most intensively studied toxic waste dump. Even so, since there is so little that we know,
clearly we are dealing with the limits of technology assessment. It seems that each study is valid
only until the next one is issued. In a sense, the scenario is analogous to the famous Abbott and
Costello routine, "Who's on First," but the consequences are tragic-not farcical. The unknowns
are almost infinite and understandably frightening. It may be true, as President Roosevelt said in
his inaugural address, that "[tihe only thing to fear is fear itself." But convincing the public that
there is nothing to fear vis-a-vis toxic substances, toxic waste dumps, radiation, and the like is
asking the impossible.
128. Begley & Rosenberg, What to Do with a Mouthful of Mercury?, NEWSWEEK. Jan. 14,
1991, at 45; see Lehman, Putting to Rest the Mercury Fillings Flap, Boston Globe, Jan. 7, 1991,
at 33, col. 4.
129. Lehman, supra note 128, at 36, col. 5. In fact, dentists exposed to mercury at work and
through fillings in their own teeth do not have higher levels of multiple sclerosis, arthritis or other
chronic diseases than the general public. Id. at 60, col. I.
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Responsible media coverage is needed. Instead of immediately speculating
on the potential risks involved in a proposal, and blowing the risks out of pro-
portion, editors should require reporters to investigate the factual basis of the
claims before leading off the 6:00 p.m. news with a parade of horrors. As a
major component of a successful siting plan, the proponents should provide
objective information to the media from the beginning of the process, as well
as keeping reporters constantly apprised of developments.
B. Legal Solutions
1. Judicial Response
The response to the NIMBY phenomenon must also involve a change in
perspective by the judiciary. In the 1970s and 1980s, the courts played vital
roles in aggressively protecting environmental values. Certainly, the environ-
mental record of the agencies was spotty. 80 However, the balance has swung
so far toward environmental protection that the courts now have to recognize
the competing values of society. Courts must, of course, continue to be vigilant
in protecting environmental values, but they must also recognize that not every
claim of environmental injury warrants judicial intervention. Courts have to
distinguish substantial risks from minimal risks. We need to recognize that not
every tree should be saved, scenic vista preserved, or stone left unturned.
Every project, every proposal, every site will have environmental consequences
in a broad sense. However, not every proposal should be blocked. Instead, a
sense of proportion is needed. Only a substantial change in existing political
and judicial mores will dramatically cut the NIMBian Knot. At some point,
courts have to say "enough is enough," recognize that the broad societal need
for certain projects outweighs the adverse environmental impacts, and see
130. For example, in the epochal struggle over the proposed Storm King Mountain pumped-
storage facility on the Hudson River 100 miles above New York City, the Federal Power Com-
mission wrote:
Just as the mountain has swallowed the scar of the highway, the intrusive railroad
structures and fills, and tolerates both the barges and scows which pass by it, and the
thoughtless humans who visit it without seeing it, so it will swallow the structures
which will serve the needs of people for electric power.
In re Consolidated Edison Co., 85 P.U.R.3d 129, 138-39 (1970), affd sub nom., Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 197 1), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
926 (1972). Chairman Nassikas of the Federal Power Commission subsequently stated, "I'm a
conservationist too," but added that his agency's first mission is to encourage "an abundant supply
of electric energy throughout the United States." N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1973, at 19, col. 1; see
also Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that agencies must balance economic concerns with environmental fac-
tors when considering applications for construction permits), disapproved by Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); National Au-
dubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983) (stating
that when exercising its sovereign power to allocate water resources in the public interest, the
state is not bound by prior allocation decisions may be inconsistent with current needs), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
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through the tactics of NIMBian delay for what they are.
A series of cases involving a toxic waste landfill in Wilsonville, Illinois, illus-
trates the need for a changed perspective." 1 The landfill involved was located
on 130 acres of land in and adjacent to the southern border of the Village of
Wilsonville.""3 Farmland surrounded the landfill on three sides. 133 Much of the
site and surrounding area was located above an abandoned coal mine.134 Sev-
enty-three water wells existed in the village at the time. 3s Materials buried at
the site included PCBs, cyanide, asbestos, pesticides, mercury, and arsenic. 3 6
The facility was duly licensed and regulated by the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency ("IEPA").37 The United States Environmental Protection
Agency attested to the need for the use of the landfill. 38 Each delivery of
waste material to the site had to be accompanied by a supplemental permit
issued by IEPA. 39 One hundred eighty-five permits for each separate waste to
be disposed of in the site were thereby obtained before operations com-
menced.140 There was no showing of present leakage or other danger, but the
possibility existed of some leakage in the future."
The plaintiffs included the Village of Wilsonville, the County of Macoupin,
and the Illinois Attorney General." 2 All sought injunctive relief on the com-
131. See Village of Wilsonville v. Earthline Corp., 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2137 (111. Cir.
Ct. 1978), affd sub nom. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., 77 II. App. 3d 618, 396 N.E.2d
552 (1979), ajf'd. 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981). See generally Note, Environmental Law/
Nuisance, 70 ILL. B.J. 586 (1982) (discussing the Wilsonville case).
132. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., 77 Ill. App. 3d 618, 622, 396 N.E.2d 552, 554
(1979), afd. 86 III. 2d I, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981).
133. Id.
134. Id. Underlying the mine spoil were soil strata of tight clay. The top strata extended to a
depth of 10 to 12 feet, followed by a thin, noncontinuous, permeable layer of saturated clay,
underlain by a strata of tight clay for an additional depth of more than 10 feet. Id. at 628, 396
N.E.2d at 561. The defendant had dug trenches in the clay to a depth of 10 to 12 feet, a width of
50 feet, and varying from 75 to 350 feet in length. Id. Ten feet separated the trenches. Id. Haz-
ardous substances were placed in the trenches and covered. Id. By the time of trial seven trenches
had been dug; three had been completely filled, and two were partially filled. Id.
135. Id. at 623, 396 N.E.2d at 555.
136. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., 86 I11. 2d 1, 9, 426 N.E.2d 824, 828 (1981).
137. Significantly, Illinois had earlier held that the state had statutorily preempted local gov-
ernment control of sanitary landfills. See Carlson v. Village of Worth, 62 Ill. 2d 406, 343 N.E.2d
493 (1975); O'Connor v. City of Rockford, 52 I11. 2d 360, 288 N.E.2d 432 (1972). After this
hazardous waste landfill opened, Illinois changed its statutes to require county board approval
before a site can begin operations. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , para. 1039(c) (Smith-Hurd
1990-91)
138. The EPA filed an amicus curiae brief in the case. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., 77
Ill. App. 3d 618, 621, 396 N.E.2d 552, 553 (1979), affid, 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981).
139. Id. at 623, 396 N.E.2d at 555.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 628, 396 N.E.2d at 561.
142. Id. at 621, 396 N.E.2d at 554. Apparently the facility was operating for five months when
the town learned of a shipment of PCB-contaminated soil to the site. A parish priest told parishio-
ners in his Sunday sermon that they were endangered by the facility. The local citizens formed an
unruly mob by the evening. See Note, Enhancing the Community's Role in Landfill Siting in
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mon law theory of nuisance. The County and the Attorney General also
sought to abate violations of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act." 8 The
trial court concluded that the site constituted a nuisance and enjoined contin-
ued operation of the landfill.144 The court ordered removal of all toxic wastes
buried there, along with any contaminated dirt, and restoration and reclama-
tion of the site area. 45 It found that the defendant's operation constituted both
a public and private nuisance. 14
The nuisance finding was based on evidence of dust and odors emitted from
the site, transportation of hazardous materials through the village en route to
the site, and ultimate air and water pollution from the burial of hazardous
materials at the site.147 Evidence also existed of spills from the toxic waste
trucks traveling through Wilsonville. 48
The major factual dispute was the possibility that hazardous substances
would migrate from their burial sites into the groundwater system.' 9 The risk
also included subsidence caused from the underground coal mines.' 50 The op-
posing expert witnesses disagreed substantially as to the nature of the risks,
including the rate of subsidence, explosive interactions, and leaking. 5 ' For ex-
ample, one witness for the plaintiffs testified "that if sufficient oxygen could
reach the buried chemicals, and he believed that it could, then an explosive
interaction of unknown date of occurrence, magnitude, and duration is
likely."' The appellate tribunal affirmed the trial court's finding for the
plaintiff, stating:
In the case before us, evidence that hazardous substances would actually
migrate out of the landfill and contaminate outside areas was, at best, un-
certain, contingent upon the existence of conditions in the subsurface which
were not known and also contingent upon the occurrence of future happen-
ings in regard to subsidence or accidental contact between substances. Con-
sidering the length of time required to contain the substances in the landfill
Illinois, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 97, 97 n.3, (citing U.S. EPA. SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE MAN-
AGEMENT FACILITIES AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION 303-16 (Executive Summary 1979)). In addition,
"local officials, including the prosecuting state's attorney, and the circuit judge who presided at
the trial, were seeking reelection and retention, respectively." Note, supra note 131, at 588.
143. Wilsonville, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 621, 396 N.E.2d at 554.
144. Village of Wilsonville v. Earthline Corp., I I Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2137 (1i1. Cir. Ct.
1978), affd sub nom. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., 77 Ill. App. 3d 618, 396 N.E.2d 552,
afl-d, 86 I1. 2d I, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981).
145. Id. at 2149.
146. Id.
147. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., 77 Ill. App. 3d 618, 627, 396 N.E.2d 552, 557
(1979), affid, 86 Il. 2d I, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981).
148. But see id. at 628, 396 N.E.2d at 558 (stating that the defendant presented evidence that
trucks containing agricultural chemicals having a greater acute toxicity than PCBs routinely
transported through town).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 628-29, 396 N.E.2d at 559.
152. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., 86 III. 2d 1, 12, 426 N.E.2d 824, 830 (1981).
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because of their toxicity, however, we conclude that the trier of fact could
have determined that there was a reasonable likelihood that escape would
take place sometime in the future."'
The appellate opinion then emphasized the potential risks. The court cited the
Restatement of Torts to the effect that the more- serious the impending harm,
the less justification there need be for taking the chances that are involved in
pronouncing the harm too remote.154 In fact, the court stated:
The trial court could have determined from the evidence that the harm that
would impend because of the danger that hazardous substances might es-
cape was so serious that no justification existed to deny the injunction even
though the feared harm was uncertain as to occurrence and, in any event,
unlikely to occur until the distant future.88
The court of appeals agreed that to balance the equities would have been inap-
propriate in this case because the "extremely serious nature of the possible
harm" overrode the fact that it was remote.156
In taking the case to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant argued that
courts should require a showing of a substantial risk of certain and extreme
future harm before issuing an injunction. 157 The defendant urged the court to
define this standard in terms of a "dangerous probability" that the threatened
or potential injury would occur. 158
The Illinois Supreme Court cited Dean Prosser for the proposition that an
injunction may issue when it is highly probable that the activity will lead to a
nuisance.15 The court stated that there is no need to wait until the injury
occurs before relief is granted.1 60 The court found it highly probable that an
escape from the chemical waste-deposit site would bring about a substantial
injury.' 6' The Illinois Supreme Court deferred, as normal, to the findings of
153. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., 77 III. App. 3d 618, 634-35, 396 N.E.2d 552, 563
(1979), aftd, 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981).
154. Id. at 635-36, 396 N.E.2d at 563-64 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 933
comment on subsection (1) (1977)).
155. Id., 396 N.E.2d at 564.
156. Id. at 638, 396 N.E.2d at 565.
157. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., 86 111. 2d 1, 25, 426 N.E.2d 824, 836 (1981).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 26, 426 N.E.2d at 836 (citing D. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS 603 (4th ed. 1971)).
160. Id. at 27, 426 N.E.2d at 837.
161. Id. The court stated:
[W]e think it is sufficiently clear that it is highly probable that the instant site will
constitute a public nuisance if, through either an explosive interaction, migration, sub-
sidence, or the "bottleneck effect," the highly toxic chemical wastes deposited at the
site escape and contaminate the air, water, or ground around the site. That such an
event will occur was positively attested to by several expert witnesses. A court does
not have to wait for it to happen before it can enjoin such a result. Additionally, the
fact is that the condition of a nuisance is already present at the site due to the loca-
tion of the site and the manner in which it has been operated. Under these circum-
stances, if a court can prevent any damage from occurring, it should do so.
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fact made by the trial court.16
For the court, the gist of the case was "that the defendant is engaged in an
extremely hazardous undertaking at an unsuitable location, which seriously
and imminently poses a threat to the public health."'63 The court recognized
the need for such facilities, but emphasized that they "must be located in a
secure place, where it will pose no threat to health or life, now, or in the
future."' 6' In other words, the Illinois courts succumbed to the "what if" sce-
nario, and demanded the impossible-a zero-risk solution.
The case epitomizes judicial acceptance of the "what if" scenario. The
parade of horrors was sufficiently great, and the testimony of plaintiffs' experts
sufficiently credible, that the courts in effect second-guessed the regulatory
agencies otherwise charged with assessing risks and safety."' Wilsonville rep-
resents the first time that a state-permitted landfill had been ordered shut
down and its chemicals removed. This type of judicial response costs society
greatly, as seen by the lack of available disposal sites.' 66 The costs to the de-
fendant in Wilsonville were also great, including $24.5 million to close the
site,167 and $2.5 million to settle a private lawsuit. 68
While the Wilsonville litigation has been followed on occasion,'6 a contrary
judicial motif for resolving the NIMBY problem is developing. This motif pri-
marily arises through the commerce clause, preemption doctrine, and equita-
ble relief, particularly in the context of nuisance law and impact statement
analysis.
2. The Commerce Clause
One major legal avenue of attack on NIMBYism has been the commerce
clause. For our purposes, the two major cases are City of Philadelphia v. New
id.
162. Id. at 15, 426 N.E.2d at 831.
163. Id. at 30, 426 N.E.2d at 838.
164. Id. at 31, 426 N.E.2d at 838.
165. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
166. The appellate decision recognized the undeniable need for hazardous disposal sites and the
possibility for illegal disposal in the absence of approved disposal sites. These illegal disposals
could pose a far greater danger than any resulting from the Wilsonville landfill. Village of Wil-
sonville v. SCA Servs., 77 III. App. 3d 618, 636, 396 N.E.2d 552, 564 (1979), afJ'd, 86 Ill. 2d I,
426 N.E.2d 824 (1981).
167. Boston Globe, June 24, 1982, at 25, col. 4.
168. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1987, at A23, col. 3.
169. Cf. Neal v. Darby, 282 S.C. 277, 318 S.E.2d 18 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the evi-
dence established that the landfill involved was a public nuisance because of its proximity to resi-
dential areas and a primary water source); Sharon Steel Corp. v. City of Fairmont, 334 S.E.2d
616 (W. Va. 1985) (holding that a local ordinance which banned hazardous waste disposal in the
city did not violate substantive due process, nor was it preempted by RCRA), appeal dismissed,
474 U.S. 1098 (1986); see also Fondessy Enter. v. City of Oregon, 23 Ohio St. 3d 213, 492
N.E.2d 797 (1986) (holding that a municipal ordinance that imposed permit fee and recordkeep-
ing requirements gave the city authority to enforce monitoring of hazardous waste facilities inside
the city's corporate limits).
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Jersey7 ' and Sporhase v. Nebraska.'71
The parameters of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey are, of course, well
known. New Jersey attempted to prolong the life of its dumps by essentially
banning imported trash that lacked commercial value in New Jersey. 72 The
Supreme Court held that all objects of interstate trade merit commerce clause
protection, thereby including garbage and hazardous wastes within the protec-
tive environs of the commerce clause.173
A critical passage in City of Philadelphia reads as follows:
[Wihere simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a vir-
tually per se rule of invalidity has been erected. . . .The clearest example
of such legislation is a law that overtly blocks the flow of interstate com-
merce at a. State's border. . . .But where other legislative objectives are
credibly advanced and there is no patent discrimination against interstate
trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible approach, the general
contours of which were outlined in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.17 4
Therefore, the critical question is whether the bill is essentially a protectionist
measure, or whether it is based on legitimate local concerns with only inciden-
tal effects on interstate commerce. A rule of per se invalidity applies when the
purpose is simple economic protectionism. In other words, are we protecting
the free flow of commerce against the actions of individual states, which would
otherwise lead to economic balkanization of the fifty states?
The New Jersey statute at issue in City of Philadelphia was clearly an act
of economic protectionism because it distinguished between in-state and out-
of-state garbage on the basis of origin even though New Jersey was unable to
show any qualitative difference in the garbage based upon the state of origin.
The Court acknowledged that New Jersey could stop the flow of all garbage,
but not by singling out sources from out of state: "it may be assumed as well
that New Jersey may pursue the ends [of environmental protection] by slow-
ing the flow of all waste into the state's remaining landfills, even though inter-
state commerce may be affected.'1 In this respect, the key to invalidating the
New Jersey statute was the attempt by one state to isolate itself from a prob-
170. 437 U:S. 617 (1978).
171. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
172. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 618-19.
173. Id. at 622.
174. Id. at 624 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)). The Pike court had
stated:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public inter-
est, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits .... If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be pro-
moted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
175. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978).
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lem common to many, by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate
trade. Thus, the Court expressed strong concerns about state attempts to slow
or freeze interstate commerce for protectionist reasons." 6 By contrast, there
are valid nondiscriminatory statutes that are designed to alleviate environmen-
tal problems, such as bans on phosphate detergent regardless of the state of
origin.1'7
It is, of course, ironic that Pennsylvania, which sought to open New Jersey's
border in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, is now attempting to close its
borders.17 8 In his concluding passage in the case, Justice Stewart had some
prescient thoughts about the commerce clause:
Today, cities in Pennsylvania and New York find it expedient or necessary
to send their waste into New Jersey for disposal and New Jersey claims the
right to close its borders to such traffic. Tomorrow cities in New Jersey may
find it expedient or necessary to send their waste into Pennsylvania or New
York for disposal, and those States might then claim the right to close their
borders. The Commerce Clause will protect New Jersey in the future just as
it protects her neighbors now, from efforts by one State to isolate itself in
the stream of interstate commerce from a problem shared by all. 7'
A critical question expressly left open by the case relates to publicly owned
facilities. In a footnote in City of Philadelphia, the Court stated, "We express
no opinion about New Jersey's power, consistent with the Commerce Clause,
to restrict to state residents access to state-owned resources."" 80 Several states
and communities have taken advantage of this possible loophole by controlling
access to publicly owned facilities. Pursuant to the unanswered question, some
opinions have upheld bans on foreign garbage in publicly owned landfills. 8
176. See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979). In Hughes, the Court struck
down a state statute that prohibited the export of minnows, holding that "facial discrimination by
itself may be a fatal defect, regardless of the State's purpose." Id. at 337.
177. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing Pennsylvania's two-year mora-
torium on landfill construction or expansion).
179. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629.
180. Id. at 627 n.6. In a subsequent case, the Court upheld a South Dakota State Court Com-
mission decision to confine cement sales from the state-owned plant to South Dakota residents in a
time of a cement shortage. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). See generally Blumoff,
The State Proprietary Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Persistent Nineteenth
Century Anomaly, 1984 S. ILL. U.L.J. 73 (discussing the impact of Reeves on the proprietary
exception to the dormant commerce clause).
181. See Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987); Evergreen Waste Sys.
v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127 (D. Or. 1986), ajfd on other grounds, 820 F.2d
1482 (9th Cir. 1987).
A variation is to limit garbage disposal at a county dump to sources generated in the county.
Swin Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1127 (1990); Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1987); Waste Aid Sys. v. Citrus
County, 613 F. Supp. 102 (M.D. Fla. 1985). Contra Diamond Waste v. Monroe County, 731 F.
Supp. 505 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (holding that Georgia statute governing the transportation of waste
violated the commerce clause).
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One of the premises we should keep in mind as an outgrowth of City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey is the need to avoid a crazy-quilt pattern of local
regulations, particularly when the underlying motivation is NIMBYism. Con-
sequently, local licensing fees for transporters have been struck down, since
the cumulative effects of each town, city, or county imposing fees and different
licensing requirements on transportation would severely impact interstate com-
merce. 82 Examples of such burdensome local regulations might include a
county ordinance which absolutely prohibits the transportation through and
disposal of hazardous waste in the county from outside the county, or a sepa-
rate requirement of a license to transport hazardous waste through the county,
with a separate certificate for radioactive material. Thus, Maryland held, pur-
suant to the commerce clause, that the regulation of hazardous wastes moving
in interstate commerce is not a subject admitting of a "diversity of treatment"
so as to enable every county to enact its own rules. 183
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that safety measures carry a strong
presumption of legitimacy, but even nondiscriminatory local safety measures
that place an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce may be struck
down.184 One major result of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey is that the
adoption of outright bans on interstate commerce has diminished. Strict bans
have been struck down. 8 Instead, states and communities are getting creative
in trying to skirt the parameters of the case, such as by enacting reciprocity
statutes.186
182. Local regulation of hazardous waste transportation illustrates the inconsistency and irra-
tionality of regulations that are based upon perceived risk rather than actual risk. It is estimated
that shipments of hazardous wastes account for less than three percent of all hazardous materials
shipped in the United States. Between 1975 and 1985, there was an average of 1,750 reportable
accidents per year involving cargo tank trucks carrying hazardous materials. Only 321 of these
resulted in accident-related releases of hazardous materials. Sixty-nine percent of this number, in
turn, involved gasoline or oil products. Crim, supra note 10, at 132, 137.
183. Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 292 Md. 136, 147-48, 438 A.2d 269, 274-
78 (1981); see also Union Pac. R.R. v. Las Vegas, 747 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Nev. 1989) (holding
that a Las Vegas hazardous materials transportation ordinance was preempted by the Federal
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act and unconstitutional under the commerce and due pro-
cess clauses).
184. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (declaring an Illinois statute that
required a specified type of mudguards on trucks invalid since it unduly and unreasonably bur-
dened interstate commerce).
185. See, e.g.. Industrial Maintenance Serv. v. Moore, 677 F. Supp. 436 (S.D. W. Va. 1987)
(holding that solid waste is an item of interstate commerce protected by the commerce clause
when it is transported across state lines); Shayne Bros. v. Prince George's County, 556 F. Supp.
182 (D. Md. 1983) (holding that an ordinance that prohibited the use of local landfill by out-of-
state interests violated the interstate commerce clause); Dutchess Sanitation, Inc. v. Town of Plat-
tekill, 51 N.Y.2d 670, 417 N:E.2d 74, 435 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1980) (holding that a town ordinance
that forbade out-of-town parties from disposing of rubbish in town, violated the commerce clause).
186. An Indiana statute, for example, required a driver who was transporting out-of-state waste
to present the landfill operator with a document from a health officer from the foreign state certi-
fying that the solid waste did not contain any hazardous waste in violation of federal law, or any
infectious waste in violation of Indiana law. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-22-2.7(c)(2) (Burns 1990). In
addition, a higher tippage fee was assessed against out-of-state waste. Id. § 13-9.5-5-1. The fee
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In this respect, the major case is Sporhase v. Nebraska.187 In Sporhase, the
Court struck down a Nebraska statute which permitted the export of water
only to states with a reciprocal agreement with Nebraska.188 The facts were
somewhat unique in that the appellants owned contiguous tracts of land in
Colorado and Nebraska.189 The land was irrigated by a well in Nebraska.19
The appellants did not obtain the requisite permit from Nebraska to transfer
ground water out-of-state.191 Colorado did not allow water exports to Ne-
braska, so a Nebraska permit could not issue under Nebraska law. 9 Ne-
braska sought to enjoin the appellants from further diversions.' 93
Sporhase held that water was a subject of interstate commerce,"94 overrul-
ing an older case, Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter,'9 5 which had held
that states could embargo water at their discretion. 98 The Sporhase Court
again applied the standard formulation, which was reaffirmed in City of Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey. 9 The Court thus held that a state may not limit water
exports merely to protect local economic interests. 98
The Court further recognized that the conservation and preservation of di-
minishing sources of ground water is an unquestionably legitimate and highly
important purpose. 9 The Court accepted the validity of the first three condi-
tions for the withdrawal of water for an interstate transfer: 1) that the re-
quested withdrawal was reasonable, 2) that it was not contrary to the conser-
vation and use of ground water, and 3) that it was not otherwise detrimental
to the public welfare. 0 As the Court noted, a state that "imposes severe with-
drawal and use restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating against
interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of
water out of the State." 0' In such a situation, the suspect discrimination
against interstate commerce may be lacking.202
was equal to the difference between the cost of dumping the trash in the landfill closest to the
source of the trash and the cost charged by the Indiana landfill operator. Id. The statute would
have the effect, to a large extent, of discouraging the importation of trash into Indiana due to its
provisions for increased transportation costs. The statute, however, was recently struck down by a
federal district court based on a violation of the commerce clause. See Government Suppliers
Consolidating Servs. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
187. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
188. Id. at 960.
189. Id. at 944.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 957.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 953-54.
195. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
196. Id. at 357.
197. 437 U.S. 617 (1978); see supra note 174 and accompanying text.
198. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 955.
201. Id. at 955-56.
202. Id.
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The Court also gave states some power to protect the health of their citi-
zens, such that a state could restrict water exports under certain circumstances
in times and places of shortage: 03
If it could be shown that the State as a whole suffers a water shortage, that
the intrastate transportation of water from areas of abundance to areas of
shortage is feasible regardless of distance, and that the importation of water
from adjoining States would roughly compensate for any exportation to
those States, then the conservation and preservation purpose might be credi-
bly advanced for the reciprocity provision. 04
The Court acknowledged, therefore, that it would defer to some discriminatory
export restrictions, and would uphold a reciprocity requirement that was nar-
rowly tailored to the state's legitimate conservation and preservation intent.2 05
"Narrowly tailored" would entail "a close means-end relationship."20 The
state would bear the burden of demonstrating the requisite close fit between
the purpose and means used, such as a reciprocity requirement °.2 0
For us, the significance of Sporhase lies not in its treatment of water as an
object of interstate commerce; rather, Sporhase is significant for its invalida-
tion of the reciprocity clause provision. The reciprocity clause was discrimina-
tory on its face since it banned all water exports to Colorado. Such a facially
discriminatory measure will receive the "strictest scrutiny" by the Court. The
provision must thereby have a "close fit" with its avowed purpose if it is to
survive a constitutional challenge. The Nebraska statute failed because the
reciprocity requirement was an explicit barrier to interstate commerce. The
requirement was not narrowly tailored to serve the avowed purposes of conser-
vation and preservation. 20 8
Reciprocity statutes have become common in that imports from other states
will be allowed into the receiving state only if the state of origin has enacted
substantially similar standards for controlling industrial waste disposal. Pursu-
ant to Sporhase, however, these restrictions have frequently been struck
down.20 9
Sporhase was directly followed by a recent case involving Alabama's Emelle
facility.2"0 Alabama's Holley Bill prohibited commercial waste management
facilities from accepting hazardous wastes generated outside Alabama unless
the exporting states met certain statutory requirements, which included pre-
203. Id. at 956.
204. Id. at 958.
205. Id. at 957-58.
206. Id. at 958.
207. Id. at 957.
208. Id.
209. See Oklahoma State Dep't of Health v. Lamberton, 582 F.2d 1267 (10th Cir. 1978);
Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978).
210. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910
F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990), modified, reh'g denied, 924 F.2d 1001 (1991).
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treatment and preapproval of the exporting state generators by Alabama."'
The Holley Bill prohibited the owner or operator of a commercial hazardous
waste management facility in Alabama from treating or disposing of hazard-
ous wastes generated in a state other than Alabama, if the other state either
(1) prohibited the treatment or disposal of hazardous waste within its borders
and had no facility for such, or (2) had no existing facility for treating or
disposing of hazardous waste and had not entered into an interstate or regional
agreement, to which Alabama was also a signatory, for disposing of its
wastes. 12 The Holley Bill also prohibited commercial waste management fa-
cilities in Alabama from contracting with a state other than Alabama to sat-
isfy the other state's capacity assurance obligation.21 38
One problem with the Alabama statute was that, assuming it was related to
health and safety, it did not ban the shipment of all hazardous wastes into the
state based upon characteristics of the wastes. Instead, only shipments from
certain states were banned, based upon the state of origin. As stated in City of
Philadelphia, that purpose "may not be accomplished by discriminating
against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is
some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently. 21 4 The Ala-
bama measure did not distinguish on the basis of the type of waste, or degree
of dangerousness, but on the basis of the state of generation. Therefore, it
facially discriminated against interstate commerce.
At first blush, reciprocity statutes smack of economic protectionism. How-
ever, they may well be the best means to resolve the siting disputes. There is
no question that by using state and local health and safety measures, Ala-
bama, Louisiana, and South Carolina could simply close their facilities. Un-
doubtedly every landfill can be found in violation of some health and safety
requirement. Perfection, including compliance with statutes, is impossible in a
human society. We must realize, therefore, that Alabama could always close
the Emelle facility through a combination of taxes21 5 and rigorous enforce-
ment of health and safety statutes. Consequently, a state can use a history of
violations against a facility, such as a landfill, to force it to close.21 ' So long as
the state does not discriminate between in-state and out-of-state waste, it can
211. Id. at 715.
212. Id. at 717.
213. Id.
214. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-67 (1978).
215. Alabama has separately imposed fees of $112 per ton on out-of-state hazardous waste
brought into Alabama for disposal, versus $40 per ton for in-state waste. This tax structure is of
questionable legality. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Alabama Dep't of Revenue, No.
90-1098-PH (Ala. Cir. Ct., Feb. 28, 1991). While a tax that discriminates between in-state and
out-of-state sources will most likely be unconstitutional, Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441
U.S. 141 (1979) (holding that a higher tax on electricity transmitted out of state was invalid), a
tax that treats the two equally will be upheld, even if it increases costs for the source state. See
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (upholding a 30% coal severance
tax on the basis that it applied to all coal mined in Montana regardless of ultimate destination).
216. See, e.g., EPA v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990) (or-
dering permanent closing of a hazardous waste disposal site due to RCRA violations).
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legally shut the facility down. There is no reason to believe that Alabama,2 1 7
Louisiana, and South Carolina will forever relish being the toxic waste dumps
for the rest of the country, 218 just as New Jersey no longer wished to be known
as a "Toxic Land Bridge" between Philadelphia and New York.219 Society
cannot reasonably expect, or demand, that receiving states continue to accept
hazardous waste from states such as North Carolina, 220 which will not build a
facility of its own. Yet, for the receiving states to shut their facilities on a
nondiscriminatory basis will only exacerbate the national problem.
A reciprocity clause will permit these states to keep their sites open, while
putting pressure on states elsewhere to resolve their own problems in a way
that meets the reciprocity conditions. The purpose of reciprocity is to force
states to address their problems, such as solid or hazardous waste, rather than
to export them blithely to other states. As indicated, without use of reciprocity
clauses, each state would be free, on traditional health and safety grounds, to
close all landfills and hazardous waste facilities within its borders. The effect
of such actions would be to chill interstate commerce, and turn the overall
national problem into a true disaster. There is, at present, little incentive for
generating states, such as Massachusetts, New Jersey, and North Carolina, to
resolve their hazardous waste disposal problems internally, so long as there is
an Alabama, Louisiana or South Carolina to receive their wastes.
If, pursuant to City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the basic question is
whether the state is attempting to isolate itself from a problem common to
many, then the reciprocity statute passes the standard as long as the state
imposes the same preconditions on out-of-state waste as on its own. These
measures will in fact promote interstate commerce by forcing each state to
face up to its problems.
One of the goals of the commerce clause is to break down barriers to the
free flow of commerce. One of society's goals is to resolve the national solid/
217. As noted in the case, Alabama shipped about 57,000 tons of hazardous waste out of state
for management, but imported about 500,000 tons for treatment and disposal. National Solid
Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 717 n.6 (1 I th
Cir. 1990), modified, reh'g denied, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1991).
218. Thus, in June, 1990, South Carolina enacted a statute to limit the amount of hazardous
waste that can be imported into the state to I10,000 tons. Governor Signs Hazardous Waste
Import Bill; Owners of Commercial Landfill Plan Lawsuit, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 376
(June 22, 1990).
219. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). For a discussion of City of
Philadelphia, see supra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., South Carolina to Prohibit Hazardous Waste from North Carolina at All
Waste Facilities. 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1597 (Dec. 28, 1990); N.Y. Times, Mar. II,
1991, at A20, col. 4. North Carolina exported 111.5 million pounds of hazardous waste in 1989,
of which approximately 71,000,000 pounds went to Alabama and South Carolina. After two years
of futile effort, North Carolina failed to come up with solutions to disposing of hazardous waste in
North Carolina, either by disposal sites or incineration. Alabama and South Carolina have re-
sponded by barring all North Carolina's hazardous waste from their states. The federal govern-
ment has threatened to withhold federal cleanup money to North Carolina. South Carolina to
Prohibit Hazardous Waste. supra, at 1597; N.Y. Times, supra, at A20.
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hazardous waste disposal problem by maximizing the available options. Unlike
the goal of an individual community, the broader goal is not to shut down
facilities. Reciprocity agreements will foster solutions if otherwise applied on a
nondiscriminatory basis. Use of reciprocity clauses by states such as Alabama
is also one of the few tools that will realistically compel any semblance of
regional planning across state lines. These provisions can thus serve as an im-
petus to local, regional, and interstate cooperation.
In looking at other commerce clause issues today, it is important to note
that media focus often causes state and local jurisdictions to enact measures
which are not necessarily designed to further some legitimate, local concern.
Rather, media focus often results in legislative solutions that address broadly
recognized, environmental concerns of society as a whole. For example, Ver-
mont banned, effective with the 1993 model year, automobile air conditioners
containing chlorofluorocarbons for coolants. 221 The purpose of the statute was
to help preserve the earth's ozone level. In this respect, the state has taken it
upon itself to help solve a national or international problem.
Conversely, several communities are banning polystyrene packaging, as used
by McDonald's and other fast food restaurants, in efforts both to encourage
recycling and to prolong the life of existing landfills. 222 Such nondiscrimina-
tory bans, clearly designed to promote legitimate local concerns, should be
deserving of greater constitutional protection than when the community is at-
tempting to solve the world's problems. 22 1
221. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 573 (1989).
222. In 1988, Suffolk County, New York banned the use of plastic grocery bags and other
plastic food containers, effective in July, 1989. N.Y. Times, April 30, 1988, at 1, col. 1. The ban
includes polystyrene packaging, and was a reaction in part to the solid waste disposal crisis on
Long Island. Id. Several other communities followed suit. McDonald's subsequently announced
that it was phasing out its plastic foam meal containers. Wall. St. J., Nov. 2, 1990, at A3, col. 2.
See generally Note, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally, St. Paul's Plastic Packaging Ordi-
nance, II HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL. 151 (1990) (discussing how state and federal environmental
policies are affected through local legislation, and focusing on St. Paul, Minnesota's recently en-
acted statute that regulated the use of certain plastic food and drink packaging).
223. Analogous measures involving phosphate detergent bans and beverage container deposit
provisions, often referred to as "Bottle Bills," have been sustained against commerce clause at-
tacks, even though there is often a substantial impact on the free flow of commerce. These provi-
sions are upheld because they do not discriminate between in-state and out-of-state sources of the
substance, and because they are attempting to resolve a clearly perceived state or local problem.
See Procter & Gamble v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that a phosphate
detergent ban initiated by the City of Chicago was a legitimate interest that did not constitute an
impermissible interference with interstate commerce), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Bowie
Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 335 A.2d 679 (1975) (holding that a city ordinance that
mandated return deposits on all soft drink or malt beverage containers did not violate due process,
equal protection, the commerce clause, and was not void for vagueness); Soap & Detergent Ass'n
v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 415 Mich. 728, 330 N.W.2d 346 (1982) (upholding a rule that
limited the amount of phosphorous in cleaning agents sold in the state of Michigan); Can Mfrs.
Inst. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1979) (holding that Minnesota's Package Review Act did
not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce and did not violate due process); American
Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973) (stating that a
statute that regulated beverage containers was a legitimate exercise of the police power, and did
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A final caveat is in order with respect to the commerce clause. One major
limitation to the commerce clause is that, no matter how vigorously enforced,
as presently construed it will not facilitate, by itself, the siting of new facili-
ties. The clause will, however, prevent the discriminatory closing of existing
sites and discriminatory restrictions on interstate commerce.
3. Preemption
The federal government and the states may preempt actions by lesser gov-
ernmental bodies by including express preemption clauses in a statute. Clearly,
when a problem reaches the point that it cries out for a solution, such as a
society wallowing in its own garbage, then the political process forces Con-
gress, the state legislatures, or other legislative entities to enact measures to
resolve the issue. Congress can always change the law to remove legal obsta-
cles to a proposal. Congress has done so in the past"" and will undoubtedly do
so in the future. At the point when the political pressures rise sufficiently to
push for legislative action, the statute enacted by the higher political author-
ity, whether it be the federal or state government, will inevitably diminish
local control. The ultimate siting decisions will often be determined by politi-
cal considerations as much as by environmental factors. Short of resorting to
violence, local communities will often lose their ability to block a LULU.
If a higher governmental authority exercises its preemption power and en-
acts a statute that now mandates or dictates a solution, it would not mean that
all the health, safety, or risk aspects have been resolved. Undoubtedly, the
statute would parallel the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which does not man-
date a level of absolute safety or zero-risk. To do so would, of course, be to
not violate the commerce clause, due process, equal protection, or the state constitution); see also
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (upholding a statute that banned
the sale of milk in plastic, nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers since the purpose of the statute
was to encourage the reuse and recycling of materials).
224. See, e.g., Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a bill
passed by Congress, which exempted an interstate highway construction project from certain re-
quirements of the Department of Transportation Act, was constitutional); Sequoyah v. TVA, 480
F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (noting that a provision in the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Bill authorized TVA to impound the Tellico River behind the controversial Tellico
Dam notwithstanding requirements of the Endangered Species Act or "any other law"), afrd, 620
F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
Another example of how legal obstacles can be put up and then pushed aside is illustrated by
the Seabrook Nuclear Plant in New Hampshire. Massachusetts, which is located just a few miles
away from the plant, attempted to block operations of the plant by refusing to participate in the
emergency response plans of the facility. These plans, often referred to as emergency evacuation
plans, were required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the aftermath of the Three Mile
Island failure. In the end, the plant received a full operating license, which was generally believed
to be a result of the 1988 presidential election. The Democratic nominee for president, Governor
Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts, strongly opposed Seabrook, whereas Vice President Bush, the
Republican nominee, backed it.
For the latest installment in the legal resolution of the Seabrook controversy, see Massachusetts
v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 924 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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chase a shibboleth.22 5 A standard of absolute safety would continue the ex-
isting NIMBian paralysis. Instead, this Act mandates a reasonable assurance
that the plant can be constructed and operated without "undue risk."'2 6
As we have seen with the transportation of nuclear waste,2 7 Congress has
preempted local control through the Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act.22 8 There are, thus, situations in which the federal government has pre-
empted local control.22 9 Similarly, there are instances in which states have pre-
empted local decisions. For example, Massachusetts has enacted legislation
that effectively preempts local, substantive control of herbicide spraying.280
Nonetheless, most regulatory statutes lack an express preemption clause, so
courts are often left to infer one. A nascent trend is clearly developing
whereby state law, at least for hazardous waste disposal, preempts local
ordinances.
In Stablex Corp. v. Town of Hooksett,"' the New Hampshire Supreme
Court overturned a local ordinance that subjected any proposed hazardous
waste facility to a popular vote.2 2 Under New Hampshire state law, permis-
sion to construct or operate a waste treatment plant must be obtained from the
state.23 3 When Stablex Corp. originally sought local and state approval to con-
struct a waste treatment facility, there was no approved hazardous waste dis-
posal facility in New Hampshire, while eight known illegal sites had been dis-
covered.22' The state legislation was enacted against this background of a state
and national emergency. The state statute created a new agency, the Bureau
of Solid Waste Management, which was empowered to administer the compre-
hensive state program. 2 3
Under the statute, a municipal hazardous waste facility review committee
was to be created by the local municipality.236 The committee's task was to
study the effect of a proposed facility on the health and welfare of the people
in the community, on its environment, and on its economy.237 The committee
225. As Chief Justice Burger wrote, "Perfect safety is a chimera; regulations must not strangle
human activity in the search for the impossible." Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 664 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 2232 (1988). See generally Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (deferring to the Atomic Energy Commission's
decision to grant a license to operate a nuclear power plant).
227. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
228. 49 U.S.C. § 1811 (1988).
229. See, e.g., CSX Transp. Inc. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 701 F. Supp. 608 (S.D. Ohio 1988)
(holding that state regulations that covered transportation of hazardous materials were preempted
under the Federal Railroad Safety Act), affd, 901 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1990).
230. See Town of Wendell v. Attorney Gen., 394 Mass. 518, 530, 476 N.E.2d 585, 592 (1985).
231. 122 N.H. 1091, 456 A.2d 94 (1982).
232. Id. at 1094-95, 1104, 456 A.2d at 95-96, 101.
233. Id. at 1094, 456 A.2d at 95.
234. Id. at 1096, 456 A.2d at 96.
235. Id. at 1097, 456 A.2d at 97.
236. Id. at 1098, 456 A.2d at 98.
237. Id.
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was required to submit a report advising a proposal, but the decision was to be
made by the state agency.2 38 In finding the local ordinance preempted by state
law, the court reiterated its views that "where the State has enacted a compre-
hensive regulatory scheme, no local actions or ordinances will be permitted to
contravene it." 239
Other states have likewise recognized that the field of hazardous waste dis-
posal is fraught with such unique concerns and dangers to both the state and
the nation that its regulation demands a statewide, rather than a local, ap-
proach.240 A more ingenious attempt by a Louisiana parish to ban a PCB and
solvent cleaning establishment, through an emergency ordinance, was struck
down as preempted by the federal Toxic Substances Control Act
("TSCA").2 41 The ordinance was aimed at closing a recently opened PCB dis-
posal facility. The facility conformed with the requirements of TSCA and the
accompanying EPA regulations.2 42 The site was within one-quarter mile of an
elementary school.148 Some of the testimony in the case revolved around stan-
dard "what if" arguments, such as the porosity of concrete, locations of the
1,000-year flood plain, and the volume of water that would pass through an
eight-inch water line at sixty pounds per square inch pressure during six hours
of continuous use.244
The court viewed TSCA as setting in place "a comprehensive, national
scheme to protect humans and the environment from the dangers of toxic sub-
stances. 2 45 TSCA includes provisions that expressly regulate PCBs.2 46 The
EPA subsequently promulgated a comprehensive set of PCB disposal regula-
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1102, 456 A.2d at 100 (citations omitted). However, Stablex Corp. subsequently
abandoned the project after a four-year struggle, much to the delight of the community. Boston
Globe, Nov. 18, 1984, at 88, col. 1.
240. Envirosafe Servs. v. County of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 735 P.2d 998 (1987) (holding that
legislative history and a comprehensive state statutory scheme impliedly preempted local statutes
attempting to regulate the disposal of hazardous wastes); Rollins Envtl. Servs. v. lberville Parish
Police Jury, 371 So.2d 1127 (La. 1979) (holding that an ordinance that prohibited the disposal of
hazardous waste within the county was unconstitutional because it was not authorized by the
legislature) superseded by statute as stated in Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n, 561 So.2d
482 (1990); see also Ensco, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that a county
ordinance that prohibited storage, treatment, or disposal of hazardous wastes was preempted by
RCRA); Midcoast Disposal, Inc. v. Town of Union, 537 A.2d 1149 (Me. 1988) (state preemption
for solid waste disposal). Contra Sharon Steel Corp. v. City of Fairmont, 334 S.E.2d 616 (W. Va.
1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 1098 (1986).
241. Rollins Envtl. Servs. (FS) v. Parish of St. James, 775 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1985); see also
Twitty v. North Carolina, 527 F. Supp. 778 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment where property owners brought action arising out of the storage of PCBs on
adjoining property), affid without opinion, 696 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1982).
242. Rollins, 775 F.2d at 630.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 632.
245. Id.
246. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B) (1988) (providing that all state regulation of hazardous chemi-
cals is preempted when the administrator of the EPA issues a conflicting rule).
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tions. 4 7 The TSCA preemption clause has a detailed procedure for obtaining
exemptions from the preemption provision.24 8
The local ordinance at first was specifically aimed at PCBs, but as amended
a month later, it applied to "solvent disposal" facilities without mentioning
PCBs.2 ' 9 The ordinance banned solvent cleaning businesses within one mile of
any "area of special concern," which was defined to include "a school, day
care center, nursing home, grain elevator, public building or auditorium, hos-
pital, church, or theater.2 50 This provision would have eliminated eighty-three
percent of the parish from consideration as a solvent disposal facility.251 An
additional provision banned solvent cleaning facilities within "an area of spe-
cial environmental concern," which was defined as "a flood hazard area or
flood plain, wetland, surface or subsurface drinking water source in St. James
Parish. '252 The provision could have been construed to ban a solvent cleaning
facility anywhere in the parish. 253
In finding the parish ordinance preempted, the federal district court de-
clared that, as a practical matter, the parish was saying "[no] without actually
really every saying no." 25" Affirming, the appellate court recognized that the
parish, "for reasons that are not difficult to comprehend, does not want this or
any other toxic waste disposal facility located within its boundaries. "255
The opinion is especially significant in that the court would not allow the
community to block indirectly an unwanted facility when a direct attack
would clearly run afoul of the preemption clause. The provisions of the ordi-
nance were creatively crafted, using environmental grounds that could serve, if
successful, as a model for communities elsewhere. Any jurisdiction could simi-
larly adopt ostensibly legitimate environmental measures that, literally ap-
plied, would stop any LULU that could not be directly blocked. 258 As men-
tioned earlier, environmental objections can be raised to any proposal;
therefore, it would not be difficult, as with the Louisiana parish, to draft an
environmental protection measure that would effectively ban the proposal.
247. 40 C.F.R. § 761.40-.79 (1989) (providing detailed specifications for labeling of specific
products that contain PCBs, as well as specifications for incineration and burial of those
products).
248. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B) (1988).
249. Rollins Envtl. Servs. (FS) v. Parish of St. James, 775 F.2d 627, 630 (5th Cir. 1985).
250. Id. at 636. The ordinance also required a two-foot slab concrete foundation for solvent
cleaning operations. Id. No other building ordinance contained such a requirement. Id. Expert
testimony indicated that six inches would be sufficient. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. (endorsing the lower court's finding that although the effect was well intended, the
ordinance was calculated to circumvent federal regulation and thereby disallow all PCB disposal
facilities in the area).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 629.
256. As the court stated, "If every locality were able to dodge responsibility for and participa-
tion in these programs through artfully designed ordinances, the national goal of safe, environ-
mentally sound toxic waste disposal would surely be frustrated." Id. at 637.
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Of course, some communities might be more subtle in masking their real
intent. We can premise, though, that any measure enacted shortly after a
LULU is announced or completed is based on NIMBY concerns and not long-
standing environmental concerns." 7 For example, East Providence, Rhode Is-
land enacted an ordinance that banned the commercial use of coal anywhere
in the city.2 58 The purpose was to block a proposed coal-fired cogeneration
electrical facility in the city." The ban was held to be preempted under state
law, and thus its future will be determined by state environmental law and
regulations. " '
Another representative example comes from Illinois, which enacted two
statutes governing worker testing and training in the hazardous waste busi-
ness. 6 1 The purposes were to promote job safety and to protect life, limb, and
property. "2 The statutes overlapped similar, but less stringent, standards
promulgated by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA"). OSHA has a general preemption clause that allows states to enter
an area covered by OSHA if they obtain permission to do So. 2 62 Illinois, like
many states, has not done so. In one sense, the Illinois provisions were part of
a patchwork of legislation and regulations that emerged from government at
various levels and reflected different approaches to containing a perceived risk.
The statutory scheme was held preempted even though it served a "dual pur-
pose"-public health and safety as well as workplace safety. 2 4
In addition, some factors in a local regulatory scheme may be ruled facially
unconstitutional for reasons other than preemption. For example, West Vir-
ginia's Solid Waste Management Act required landfill operators to obtain a
permit from the Department of Natural Resources. " 5 Numerous grounds are
provided for denying a permit, with one clause giving the director of the de-
partment the power to deny a permit solely because it is "significantly adverse
to the public sentiment of the area where the solid waste facility is, or will be,
located."26 6 In Geo-Tech Reclamation Industries v. Hamrick,26 7 two permit
applications were denied with "adverse public sentiment" given as a reason?.1
Upon challenging the denial of the applications on due process grounds, the
257. See, e.g., Ensco, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that a county
ordinance which prohibited storage, treatment, or disposal of acute hazardous waste was pre-
empted by RCRA).
258. Rhode Island Cogeneration Assocs. v. City of East Providence, 728 F. Supp. 828 (D.R.I.
1990).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 839.
261. See National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 673-74 (7th Cir.
1990) (citations omitted).
262. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11l, paras. 7702, 7802 (1989).
263. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1988).
264. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 918 F.2d at 684.
265. W. VA. CODE § 20-5F-4(b) (1989).
266. Id.
267. 886 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1989).
268. Id. at 663-64.
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applicants were granted summary judgment. 6 The Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's finding that the provision was unconstitutional, as the "po-
tential [for] mob rule was too great to ignore. 2 70
Hamrick has been followed elsewhere. For example, a district court found
"reliance upon public sentiment in the face of the substantial weight of the
scientific and technical evidence to the contrary to be an arbitrary and unrea-
sonable basis upon which to base the . . . decision.
7 1
4. Equitable Considerations
What has often been missing from the of debate the past twenty years is a
discussion of reason. Historically, nuisance law, through the concepts of rea-
sonable use and unreasonable interference, and equity, through the concept of
balancing of the equities, have considered the broad public good or benefit in
resolving a dispute. Not every proposal has been stopped or enjoined simply
because it would interfere with individuals. Instead, courts have traditionally
balanced the equities in deciding whether or not to grant injunctive relief. As
stated in Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co.: 127
Our basic point of inquiry relates to the general theory of the law of nui-
sance. This appears primarily to be based upon generally accepted ideas of
right, equity and justice. The thought is inherent that not even a fee simple
owner has a totality of rights in and with respect to his real property. In so
far as the law of nuisance is concerned, rights as to the usage of land are
relative. The general legal principle to be inferred from court action in nui-
sance cases is that no landowner will be permitted to use his land so unrea-
sonably as to interfere unreasonably with another landowner's use and en-
joyment of his land. The crux of the matter appears to be reasonableness.
Admittedly, the term is a flexible one. It has many shades and varieties of
meaning. In a nuisance case, the fundamental inquiry always appears to be
whether the use of certain land can be considered as reasonable in relation
to all the facts and surrounding circumstances. Application of the doctrine
of nuisance requires a balancing of rights, interests and convenience. 7 3
The unreasonableness test became a utilitarian test in industrial pollution
cases during the nineteenth century. No nuisance would be found if the utility
of the facility's manufacturing outweighed the harm that the neighbors suf-
fered.2 7' The factory would, therefore, be allowed to continue polluting with-
269. Id.
270. Id. at 667.
271. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. City of Maryland Heights, 747 F. Supp. 1340, 1349 (E.D. Mo.
1990).
272. 41 Wash. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952), overruled by Bradley v. American Smelting &
Ref. Co., 104 Wash. 2d 677, 709 P.2d 782 (1986).
273. Id. at 254, 248 P.2d at 382.
274. Winner, The Chancellor's Foot and Environmental Law: A Call for Better Reasoned De-
cisions in Environmental Injunctions, 9 ENVTL. L. 477, 486 (1979).
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out compensating for the damages it caused. 7 5
Over the years, the courts have found a number of land uses to be socially
valuable and have thus refused to find a nuisance. For example, in the famous
case of Nicholson v. Connecticut Halfway House,17  the court found that the
social good of halfway houses outweighed the putative private risks.2 7 Signifi-
cantly, this case echoes many of the NIMBY themes in that plaintiffs' objec-
tions were based on fear and depreciation of property values, even though no
actual harm had yet occurred.
The Nicholson court emphasized that the power of equity to grant injunc-
tive relief may be exercised only under demanding circumstances.2 7 8 The court
refused to grant such relief when the only justification proffered was fear and
apprehension based on speculation. 27 9 As noted elsewhere, the threat of irrepa-
rable injury should be proven and not assumed.2 8 0
A California case further elaborated on the role of speculative harm, or
fear, in public and private nuisance actions. In Brown v. Petrolane2 81 the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' case where
the only harm alleged was fear occasioned by the proximity of the defendant's
above-ground liquified petroleum gas facility. 82 The facility was the largest in
275. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886) (holding that
the benefits that the coal industry gave to society outweighed any harm suffered by an individual
plaintiff), overruled by Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871
(1974).
276. 153 Conn. 507, 218 A.2d 383 (1966).
277. Id. at 512-13, 218 A.2d at 386.
278. Id. at 511, 218 A.2d at 386. There is also, of course, case law to the contrary. See, e.g.,
Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 111 P. 879 (1910) (granting an injunction against the operation
of a private sanitarium, located in a residential area, that treated and cared for persons afflicted
with tuberculosis); see also Arkansas Release Guidance Found. v. Needler, 252 Ark. 194, 477
S.W.2d 821 (1972) (granting an injunction against the operation of a halfway house for parolees
and prisoners due to the diminution in property values in the area).
279. Nicholson, 153 Conn. at 511, 218 A.2d at 386. Some state statutes provide for injunctive
relief only upon a strong showing of certainty of harm, as opposed to mere speculative risks. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-125 (1975) ("Where the consequences of a nuisance about to be erected or
commenced will be irreparable in damages and such consequences are not merely possible but to a
reasonable degree certain, a court may interfere to arrest a nuisance before it is completed."); GA.
CODE ANN. § 41-2-4 (1990) ("Where the consequence of a nuisance about to be erected or com-
menced will be irreparable damage and such consequence is not merely possible but to a reasona-
ble degree certain, an injunction may be issued to restrain the nuisance before it is completed.").
280. Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 648, 653 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1296 (1990); see also Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Washington, 370 F. Supp. 1101 (D.D.C.
1974) (refusing to enjoin shopping center and garage since claimed harm was too speculative,
stating that only EPA could make a determination since the violation had not yet occurred); City
of Hammond v. Red Top Trucking Co., 409 N.E.2d 655 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a city
could not ban excavation outright within three miles of the nearest residential district);
O'Laughlin v. City of Fort Gibson, 389 P.2d 506 (Okla. 1964) (stating that clear and convincing
evidence of a reasonable probability of injury is a necessary prerequisite to granting equitable
relief against a threatened injury).
281. 102 Cal. App. 3d 720, 162 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1980).
282. Id. at 727, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
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the United States and was only 2,000 feet from the plaintiffs' home. 282 The
complaint also alleged that the facility was not sufficiently earthquake-
proof.28 '
The Brown court set forth the common law requirements for a cause of
action based on public and private nuisance. Where, as in this case, the al-
leged nuisance is claimed to be both a public and a private one, the plaintiffs
must show that the fear is common to their general community in order to
recover under a public nuisance theory."8 5 In addition, to recover under the
private nuisance theory, the plaintiffs must allege some perceptible injury to
their individual property rights apart from the harm suffered by the general
public.286 Applying these common law rules, the California appellate court
found that the plaintiffs had not plead sufficient facts to support either cause
of action;2 87 in other words, the plaintiffs' fears did not satisfy the injury
requirement.
Another classic case, one that displayed a more reasoned approach to nui-
sance claims, is Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.2"8 In Boomer, the defendant's
large cement plant, located south of Albany, clearly constituted a nuisance,
spewing air pollutants that affected neighboring lands.289 Cement plants have
historically been a major source of air pollution. 9" The plant in Boomer had
been encouraged to commence operations in an economically depressed
area.2 9" ' Despite this, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin operation of the plant.292
The damage to the plaintiffs' property was relatively small, $185,000, com-
pared to the defendant's investment of $45 million in the plant and the em-
ployment of 300 workers.2 98
The court recognized that air pollution was a problem far from solution
with adequate technical procedures yet to be developed. 29 ' The court noted
that solutions would require massive public expenditures, as well as regional
and interstate controls.2 9 5 Consequently, the court issued a call for judicial
283. Id. at 721-22, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
284. Id. at 722, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
285. Id. at 726, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 554. If the complaint only alleges public nuisance, the plain-
tiffs must allege that they suffer special injury to themselves, different from that suffered by the
rest of the community. Id. at 725, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 727, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
288. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970), on remand, 72 Misc. 2d 834,
340 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1972), affid sub noma. Kinley v. Atlantic Cement Co., 42 A.D.2d 496, 349
N.Y.S.2d 199 (1973).
289. Id. at 222, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
290. See, e.g., Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911)
(upholding an injunction that prohibited cement production until dust emissions which were dam-
aging adjoining property were controlled).
291. Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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restraint:
A court should not try to [control air pollution] on its own as a by-product
of private litigation and it seems manifest that the judicial establishment is
neither equipped in the limited nature of any judgment it can pronounce nor
prepared to lay down and implement an effective policy for the elimination
of air pollution. This is an area beyond the circumference of one private
lawsuit. It is a direct responsibility for government and should not thus be
undertaken as an incident to solving a dispute between property owners and
a single cement plant--one of many-in the Hudson River Valley.
299
As a way out of the dilemma, the Boomer court granted an injunction that
would be vacated upon the payment of permanent damages by defendant to
plaintiff. 97
Similarly, Bradley v. American Smelting & Refining Co.298 was also a fed-
eral diversity case that involved the deposit of effluents from a smelter onto the
plaintiffs' property. Somewhat analogous to the situation in Brown v. Petro-
lane,29 the plaintiffs were merely complaining of their fears and mental
anguish caused by the defendant's activities, as opposed to any physical injury
to their persons. 00 In response to a request by the federal court to resolve
certain state law issues, the Washington Supreme Court held that when the
deposit of particles or substances accumulates on the land of another, and does
not pass away, then a trespass has indeed occurred.301 However, the court
would not allow recovery unless the plaintiff had suffered actual and substan-
tial damages. 02 The court found that "no useful purpose would be served by
sanctioning actions in trespass by every landowner within a hundred miles of a
manufacturing plant. Manufacturers would be harassed and the litigious few
would cause the escalation of costs to the detriment of many."30 3
Of course, when a court balances the equities to deny injunctive relief, it is,
to some extent, sacrificing the interests of a few to the greater good of society.
However, money damages will compensate the victims when real injuries
occur.
When relief is sought, so as to enjoin a common law nuisance or a violation
of a statutory provision such as the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"), there are prerequisites that the plaintiff must meet. It is important
296. Id. at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314-15.
297. Id. at 228, 257 N.E.2d at 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
298. 104 Wash. 2d 677, 709 P.2d 782 (1985) (answering certified questions from district
court), later proceeding, 635 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
299. 102 Cal. App. 3d 720, 162 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1980). For a discussion of Brown, see supra
notes 281-87 and accompanying text.
300. See Bradley v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 635 F. Supp. 1154, 1158 (W.D. Wash.
1986).
301. Bradley, 104 Wash. at 692, 709 P.2d at 791.
302. Id.
303. ld.: cf. New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that
when the use of high-sulphur fuel was authorized by the EPA, the neighbors were precluded from
maintaining a common law nuisance action against the facility).
1991] 1051
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
to recognize that injunctions are an equitable remedy. and do not issue as a
matter of course.
Generally accepted inquiries governing the issuance of preliminary injunc-
tive relief include (1) the movant's likelihood of success on the merits, (2)
whether or not the movant will suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary
injunction does not issue, (3) whether or not that injury outweighs the harm to
other parties if the preliminary injunction is issued, and (4) whether the grant
or denial of the preliminary injunction is in the public interest.304 The plaintiff
has the burden of proof on these issues.
Section 936 of the Second Restatement of Torts provides a list of factors to
be considered in balancing the equities:
(1) The appropriateness of the remedy of injunction against a tort de-
pends upon a comparative appraisal of all of the factors in the case, includ-
ing the following primary factors:
(a) the nature of the interest to be protected,
(b) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of injunction and of other
remedies,
(c) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit,
(d) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff,
(e) the relative hardship likely to result to defendant if an injunction is
granted and to plaintiff if it is denied,
(f) the interests of third persons and of the public, and
(g) the practicability of framing and enforcing the order or judgment. 5
When injunctive relief is sought, the courts should look closely at the public
interest aspect of the balancing test. The reason for judicial restraint in the
issuance of injunctive relief is the recognition of the "particularly onerous bur-
dens".an injunction places upon the defendant and the issuing court.30 6
The Supreme Court's view on discretionary equitable relief is highlighted by
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo 0° The United States Navy has long used Vie-
ques Island, off Puerto Rico, as a weapons training site. The trial court found
a violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (now the Clean Water
Act-"CWA") for discharging munitions into navigable waters without a Na-
tional Pollution Discharge Effluents System ("NPDES") permit.308 The trial
court ordered the Navy to file for the permit, but refused to issue a permanent
304. See J. MOORE. J. LUCAS & K. SINCLAIR, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.04 (2d ed.
1991); see also Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that the
district court erred in placing the burden of proving that the preliminary injunction should not
issue on the defendant; rather, the plaintiff is required to prove that the injunction should issue).
305. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936 (1977).
306. Shreve, Federal Injunction and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 382, 388-89
(1983).
307. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
308. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 663 (D.P.R. 1979), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 643 F.2d 835 (Ist Cir.), on remand, Romero-Barcelo v. Weinberger, 12 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,374 (D.P.R. 1981), rev'd, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
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injunction. 3 9 The Court of Appeals reversed, ordering the lower court to issue
an injunction.310 The appellate court held that the CWA removed equitable
discretion, and that the statute required immediate injunctive relief for unper-
mitted pollutant discharges. "
The narrow issue the Supreme Court had to resolve was whether a district
court is required to enjoin immediately all discharges of pollutants that fail to
comply with the permit requirements of the CWA.312 On a broader level, the
question was whether injunctions must issue for statutory violations.
The Supreme Court held that discretion was available under the CWA, and
that the trial court should employ the traditional test of balancing of the equi-
ties.831 The Court quoted earlier opinions to the effect that since an injunction
is an equitable remedy, it is not a remedy that issues as a matter of course or
to restrain an act, the injurious consequences of which are merely trifling.,
According to the Court, the basis for injunctive relief in federal court is irrep-
arable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies. 31 5 The traditional function
of equity, the Court continued, has been as a "'nice adjustment and reconcili-
ation between the competing claims.' "316 Hence, the Supreme Court directed
the lower court to balance the equities between the parties.31 7
A decade earlier the Supreme Court had remarked:
Our society and its governmental instrumentalities, having been less than
alert to the needs of our environment for generations, have now taken pro-
tective steps. These developments, however praiseworthy, should not lead
courts to exercise equitable powers loosely or casually whenever a claim of
"environmental damages" is asserted. The world must go on and new envi-
ronmental legislation must be carefully meshed with more traditional pat-
terns of federal regulation. The decisional process for judges is one of bal-
ancing and it is often a most difficult task. 18
The Weinberger court echoed this theme by declaring, "In exercising their
sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public
consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction." '19 The
309. Id.
310. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 861-62 (lst Cir. 1981), on remand, Romero-
Barcelo v. Weinberger, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,374 (D.P.R. 1981), rev'd, 456 U.S.
305 (1982).
311. Id.
312. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
313. Id. at 319-20.
314. Id. (citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328 (1944), which held that under § 205(a)
of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, the granting of an injunction is not mandatory, but
is within the discretion of the court)).
315. Id. at 312.
316. Id. (citing Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)).
317. Id. at 320.
318. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 409
U.S. 1207, 1217-18 (1972).
319. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).
1991] 1053
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
Court further stated that judges are "not mechanically obligated to grant an
injunction for every violation of law."320 To the contrary, the exercise of equi-
table discretion includes the ability to deny as well as grant injunctive relief.32'
Weinberger's majority distinguished the earlier, famous snail darter case,
TVA v. Hill,322 on the basis that the purpose and language of the Endangered
Species Act,3 28 which was at issue in Hill, left no such discretion.24 Instead,
that act compelled a "flat ban" on the destruction of critical habitats. In TVA
v. Hill, the Court noted that Congress made it "abundantly clear that the
balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of
priorities. 325 Thus, unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise, courts of eq-
uity are free to, and in fact should, exercise their discretion and adopt a rea-
soned approach to determining the appropriate remedy for statutory violations.
The Supreme Court has also rejected the Ninth Circuit's view that "'irrep-
arable damage is presumed when an agency fails to evaluate thoroughly the
environmental impact of a proposed action.' "3126 Like the appellate court in
Weinberger, the Ninth Circuit had also emphasized that "'only in rare cir-
cumstances may a court refuse to issue an injunction when it finds a NEPA
violation.' "1327 In Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell128 the Su-
preme Court reversed, looking to traditional equitable principles:
[T~he environment can be fully protected without this presumption. Envi-
ronmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by
money damages and is often permanent or at least of large duration, i.e.
irreparable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of
harm will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the
environment 2 9
The Supreme Court's view on the discretionary nature of equitable relief
has been echoed in a number of NEPA suits. 30 Equitable remedies do not
320. Id. at 313.
321. Id. at 320.
322. 437 U.S. 153 (1978), superseded by statute as stated in Board of Governors v. Dimension
Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986); superseded by statute as stated in Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v.
United States Dep't of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that the act's use of the
term "shall" left little discretion for interpretation).
323. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988).
324. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314 (1982).
325. Hill, 437 U.S. at 194.
326. Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d 1414, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Save Our Eco-
systems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 1984)), rev'd in part, vacated in part, sub noan.
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
327. Id.
328. 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
329. Id. at 545 (finding that injury to subsistence resources was not a likely result of
exploration).
330. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (ruling that the defendants, federal
agency officials, did not have to file an impact statement as required by § 102(2)(c) of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, since their proposal did not entail major federal action); see also
Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1989) (ruling that a plaintiff seeking to
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exist as a matter of course. While these Supreme Court decisions are certainly
not binding on state courts deciding issues of state law, it is significant that the
California Supreme Court has issued an opinion following the spirit of these
cases.
The case, Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors,331 involved an
eleven-year dispute over a proposed 400-room Hyatt Resort north of Santa
Barbara 8 2 The proposal was vigorously contested at every turn by the im-
pacted citizens.8" The requisite permits had been obtained from the California
Coastal Commission and Santa Barbara County.38 4
The citizens wished to preserve the seventy-three acre cite as a nature pre-
serve. Yet, the proposed resort was in an old oil field site, and hence lacked
pristine qualities. In denying injunctive relief, the California Supreme Court
stated, "we caution that rules regulating the protection of the environment
must not be subverted into an instrument for the oppression and delay of so-
cial, economic or recreational development and advancement."33 5
One of the underlying rationales for granting equitable relief is the broad
public policy of pursuing environmental protection. Nuisance law does not nor-
mally balance the equities when the state brings suit, on the assumption that
the public attorney general, who represents the broad interests of the state
and, thus, society as a whole, has already conducted the requisite balancing in
deciding to sue. 36 On the other hand, private plaintiffs often sue on a private
attorney general theory, purporting to vindicate the broad public interest.
Often though, the plaintiffs are not very concerned with broad issues of envi-
ronmental protection, but rather are motivate by parochial self-interest
"garbed in the fashionable guise of environmental protection." 38 7 Plaintiffs are
enjoin the dumping of dredged materials at a disposal site had to establish actual or threatened
injury to the physical, biological, and chemical balance at the dump site), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1296 (1990); Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that the sale of oil and
gas leases by the Department of Interior would not be set aside for alleged failure to gather
sufficient evidence of environmental impact), vacated in part sub nor. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n
v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978).
331. 52 Cal. 3d 553, 801 P.2d 1161, 276 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1990) (holding that reviewing court
may not rule on the correctness of conclusions reached in an environmental impact report, but
rather must limit review to the sufficiency of the information considered).
332. Id. at 560, 801 P.2d at 1164, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 576, 801 P.2d at 1175, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
336. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (granting the state of
Georgia the right to sue in federal court for an injunction to prevent a Tennessee corporation from
discharging noxious gas over Georgia territory). In an earlier decision where private parties sought
equitable relief, an injunction was denied. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113
Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
337. In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), the appellants contended that
the New Jersey statute "while outwardly cloaked 'in the currently fashionable garb of environ-
mental protection,' . . . is actually no more than a legislative effort to suppress competition and
stabilize the cost of solid waste disposal for New Jersey residents." Id. at 625-26 (citation
omitted).
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quite right to complain of their personal injuries, but we must keep in mind
that they do not necessarily represent the broader public interest.
It is especially critical for courts to exercise discretion at the preliminary
injunction stage. One of the major tactics developed by the NIMBY move-
ment over the past two decades has been to delay a project through various
means, such that the proponents will give up, abandon the project, or relocate
it to another community. Inflationary pressures and other costs, including liti-
gation expenses, could economically doom the project during this delay. A fun-
damental instrument of delay is litigation. Courts must, therefore, exercise
their broad equitable discretion with great wisdom. The interests of the public
must be carefully weighed in the deliberative process. The balancing of the
equities is especially critical when scientific uncertainty is present. Clearly,
when plaintiffs complain of injury to the public health, the courts must take a
close look at the allegations.
In many situations the courts are asked to assess long-run health hazards in
light of limited scientific knowledge. The overall benefits to society of the
LULU may be known, but the risks are often long-term and highly specula-
tive, yet potentially grave and irreversible. Professor Rodgers described the
situation in traditional pollution compensation cases as follows: "A major diffi-
culty with modern pollution cases is that they deal not so much with provable
injuries but with risks and thus the question of the degree of injury is compli-
cated both by actual uncertainties and burden of proof preferences."ss' The
problem is succinctly stated in Reserve Mining Co. v. United States: "what
manner of judicial cognizance may be taken of the unknown. ' ss
It is important to recognize, whether it be a suit seeking injunctive relief or
one challenging or demanding the issuance of regulations, that the courts are
dealing with policy decisions on the frontiers of scientific knowledge.40 How-
ever, since so many health claims today are of a speculative and conjectural
nature, courts should demand scientific evidence of the health threat."' Courts
should, therefore, require that restrictions be based on scientific fact. Courts
are already beginning to exercise a healthy skepticism towards theoretical
claims in other contexts.3 42
338. W. RODGERS, supra note 68, at 115.
339. Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1084 (8th Cir. 1974).
340. As stated in Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974):
some of the questions involved in the promulgation of these standards are on the fron-
tiers of scientific knowledge, and consequently as to them insufficient data is presently
available to make a fully informed factual determination. Decision making must in
that circumstance depend to a greater extent upon policy judgments and less upon
purely factual analysis. Thus, in addition to currently unresolved factual issues, the
formulation of standards involves choices that by their nature require basic policy
determinations rather than resolution of factual controversies.
Id. at 474-75.
341. The Reserve Mining decision also stated, "We are a court of law, governed by rules of
proof, and unknowns may not be substituted for proof of a demonstrable hazard to the public
health." Reserve Mining, 498 F.2d at 1084.
342. See, e.g., Ohio v. EPA, 784 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the EPA could not use
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Opinions and recommendations by regulatory agencies with expertise in the
area are, pursuant to traditional administrative law, highly relevant in ad-
dressing the "what if." Since uncertainty is inherent in .these policy decisions,
the experts should be allowed to exercise their best judgment. As the Supreme
Court stated in a nuclear case, "a reviewing court must remember that the
Commission is making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the
frontiers of science. When determining this kind of scientific determinations,
as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its
most deferential. 34
Restraint is especially called for when, as with Nicholson v. Connecticut
Halfway House,8" the plaintiffs are complaining of a prospective threat. In
such a situation, the plaintiffs are in fact asking courts to predict the fu-
ture-an obviously impossible task even in situations where an adequate
database and historical record exists. It is always possible for the plaintiffs to
dream up a worst-case scenario based upon hypothesis and speculation-the
"what if." Courts must look carefully at these claims to separate fact from
fiction, probable from remote, and concrete from speculative. A bare risk of
the unknown should not amount to proof of injury. 3' 5
Courts should, therefore, subject the plaintiff's claim to strict scrutiny, to
insure that the plaintiff meets the showing of "probable irreparable harm" as
a prerequisite to the granting of injunctive relief.846
III. CONCLUSION
Alexander the Great cleverly cut the complicated Gordian Knot with his
sword. Because of our system of government by the people, of the people, and
for the people, and the underlying complexity of dissimilar issues, no such
"simplistic" approach is available to us for cutting the NIMBian Knot.
Yet, with NIMBY paralysis spreading through many areas, society has in-
modeling to set air pollution emissions limitations for smoke stacks of two electric utilities without
validating the trustworthiness of the model); Gulf South Insulation v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that there was insubstantial evidence before the
commission to support a ban on the use of urea-formaldehyde foam insulation, recognizing the
limited usefulness of animal studies when confronted with the question of toxicity); In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that studies of
animal exposure to Agent Orange were not persuasive because animal tests "are of so little proba-
tive force and are so potentially misleading as to be inadmissible"), affid, 818 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
343. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983).
344. 153 Conn. 507, 218 A.2d 383 (1966). For a discussion of Nicholson, see supra notes 276-
79 and accompanying text.
345. Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1084 (8th Cir. 1974); see also Citi-
zens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Washington, 370 F. Supp. 1101 (D.D.C. 1974) (refusing to issue a
preliminary injunction as no threat of immediate injury existed for construction of buildings).
346. See Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 648, 653 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1296 (1990); Elliott v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 747 F. Supp. 1094, 1101 (D. Vt.
1990).
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creasingly compelled communities to accept LULUs. There are obviously situ-
ations in which the political and judicial system can force an unwanted propo-
sal onto a community. To the extent that facilities cannot be voluntarily sited,
there is every reason to anticipate a greater use of coercion to force communi-
ties into accepting, even if not liking, LULUs.
Proponents of a project should recognize the concerns of the impacted com-
munities and work closely with the people who are adversely affected or
threatened by the proposal. It is imperative not to approach any given proposal
simply from a technical perspective; the nontechnical, intangible human con-
cerns often outweigh the objective criteria of the project.
From a legal perspective, courts should not appraise a proposal in isolation.
The NIMBY pattern is for the impacted community to look narrowly at the
impacts and risks posed to it alone. The "what if" becomes the critical analy-
sis for the community. Courts though, especially in the context of equity and
nuisance, should look to the total context of the proposal, including the reason-
able alternatives, and the consequences of not proceeding with it. In the con-
text of an imperfect world, a flawed approach may often be better than no
action. Probably no perfect site, either in an environmental or in an absolute
zero-risk sense, exists.
Nuisance law has traditionally recognized that we must all, to some extent,
bear with the everyday annoyances of living in an urban society. We cannot
reasonably expect perfect solitude in the middle of a city; midtown Manhattan
is not the place to listen to the music of the spheres. The NIMBY/"what if"
approach can take a minor aggravation, actual or conceivable, and blow it out
of proportion. In light of the perceived public benefits of many projects, courts
should, look closely at the "what if' before readily issuing injunctive relief.
Reserve Mining asked the question: What cognizance should be taken of the
unknown?3 17 Our response is that "what if' claims must be assessed with a
healthy skepticism. The relative ease of crafting a "what if" should not blind
courts into looking essentially at the speculative impacts on the community,
versus the project in its total context.
In doing so, we must recognize that we are taking a risk, hopefully of both
low probability and magnitude, with the future. The alternative, though, is to
perpetuate NIMBian paralysis.
347. Reserve Mining, 498 F.2d at 1084.
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